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1) INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine and assess the participation of the European Union 
(EU) and its Member States (MS) in the dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), with a focus on one legally and politically important question: how their 
unique position as full WTO members has affected their respective responsibility for the 
performance of WTO obligations. As it is the case for any other ‘mixed’ agreement, this joint 
EU/MS membership of the WTO inevitably prompts the question of ‘who is responsible’ 
towards third parties for breaches of WTO law. The question of the EU’s international 
responsibility vis-à-vis that of its Member States has been the subject of intense study in the 
past years, 1 partly due to the increasingly prominent role of the Union on the international 
scene but also the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of International Organisations.2 And yet within this broader debate, the 
WTO is often presented in the academic literature as providing both an ‘exceptional’ and 
‘exemplary’ case-study.  
 
Not only is the WTO one of the rare international fora in which the EU can fully participate 
as a party in dispute settlement proceedings, but the Union –perhaps not surprisingly as one 
of the world’s leading trade powers– has actually been one of the dominant players in the 
WTO dispute settlement system: out of the total 496 disputes that have been brought for 
resolution to the WTO since 1995, the EU (alone) has participated in 312 of them. 3 
Therefore, in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system, the question of EU/MS 
international responsibility is not only of theoretical significance, but also highly relevant in 
practice. Moreover, the active participation of the EU in the WTO dispute settlement system 
has been praised as constituting an example of its international actorness and leadership: in 
fact, the Union has been eager to come forward as single litigant and to assume sole 
responsibility in WTO disputes, even for alleged breaches by its Member States. Against this 
background, it has been argued that WTO dispute settlement practice shows how the duty of 
cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) has allowed the EU to speak with one unified voice, with that 
voice being the European Commission as porte-parole for the Union.4  
                                                        
1 See e.g., E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and 
International Perspectives (Hart, 2013); and further references in section 2 below. 
2 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, annexed to UNGA Res 66/100, UN Doc 
A/Res/66/100, 27 February 2012 [hereinafter, DARIO]. 
3 See WTO, ‘Disputes by Country/Territory’, at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last visited on 16 June 2015.  
4 See e.g., A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, ‘The ‘Odd Couple’: Responsibility of the EU at the WTO’ in E. 
Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and International 
Perspectives (Hart, 2013), at 252 and 254-255; P. Eeckhout,‘The EU and its Member States in the WTO—Issues 
of Responsibility’ in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), at 6-7. That being said, EU Member States have of course continued to exert 
considerable influence over the conduct of WTO litigation through internal institutional structures (notably, the 
Council and the Trade Policy Committee; see Articles 207(3) and 218(9) TFEU), and worked closely with the 
While generally upholding this prevailing view that the EU’s participation in the WTO 
dispute settlement system has been a ‘success story’, this chapter will offer a more nuanced 
assessment of the Union’s eagerness to assume lead responsibility for breaches of WTO law, 
in terms of both the degree of third-party acceptance and the relative impact of EU own rules. After 
outlining the theoretical questions of international responsibility stemming from the parallel 
EU/MS membership of the WTO (section 2), the chapter will proceed to analyse how this 
issue has been tackled in the practice of WTO dispute settlement. Drawing upon this in-
depth analysis of practice, two main arguments will be advanced. First, the extent to which 
the EU’s assertion of exclusive participation and responsibility has been accepted by other 
WTO members and dispute settlement organs ought to be qualified, particularly in light of 
more recent, post-Lisbon, WTO disputes (section 3). Second, the approach to EU/MS 
international responsibility we have witnessed in the WTO dispute settlement system has not 
just been determined by the EU internal rules –i.e., a pure ‘competence model’, whereby the 
exclusive (external) competence of the EU for virtually all WTO matters will implicate its 
exclusive responsibility in all instances.5 Rather, the specificity of the WTO dispute settlement 
system has exercised considerable influence on whether and how such internal rules are 
relevant to the determination of EU (sole or joint) responsibility for breaches of WTO law, 
and most significantly the WTO rules on remedies which embody the very purpose of 
assigning responsibility for an internationally wrongful act in this specific treaty context. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that this ‘competence/remedy’ model for managing EU/MS 
international responsibility in the WTO, which combines both internal and external legal 
factors, may remain a case apart, unique to that dispute settlement regime (section 4). 
 
2) EU/MS JOINT MEMBERSHIP IN WTO – QUESTIONS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THEORY 
 
2.1 WTO Agreement as a ‘mixed agreement’ 
 
As it is well-known, the (umbrella) Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (or 
WTO Agreement)6 was jointly concluded by the EU and its Member States following the 
famous Opinion 1/94,7 where the EU Court of Justice ruled that the Union8 had exclusive 
competence to conclude only the multilateral agreements on trade in goods (Annex 1A), 
whereas such external competence was shared with the Member States in relation to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
                                                                                                                                                                      
European Commission in preparing the ‘Union’s defence’: see P.J. Kuijper, ‘International Responsibility for EU 
Mixed Agreements’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member States in 
the World (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), at 224. 
5 This ‘competence model’, with specific reference to the WTO dispute settlement system, is proposed in P.J. 
Kuijper and E. Paasivirta, ‘ EU International Responsibility and its Attribution: From the Inside Looking Out’ in 
E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and International 
Perspectives (Hart, 2013), at 54-63, and further discussed in section 4.1 below. 
6  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 
[hereinafter, WTO Agreement], which serves as an umbrella agreement for: (i) 13 multilateral agreements on 
trade in goods (Annex 1A); (ii) General Agreement on Trade in Services (Annex 1B); Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 1C); Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2); Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3); and several 
plurilateral agreements (Annex 4).  
7 Opinion 1/94 (re WTO Agreement) [1994] ECR I-5267. 
8 For the benefit of simplification, this chapter will refer to the European Union only, even though Opinion 1/94 
concerned the then ‘European Community’, and indeed it is the ‘European Communities’ that formally became 
a member of the WTO (see n 10 below).  
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 9  This is reflected in Article XI:1 WTO 
Agreement, which refers to the EU and its Member States as full ‘original members’ in their 
own right.10 Like for any other so-called ‘mixed’ agreement, this joint EU/MS membership of 
WTO inevitably prompts the question as to ‘who is responsible’ towards third parties in 
situations of non-performance. However, the WTO Agreement is somehow unusual when 
compared to other multilateral ‘mixed’ agreements, in that it does not contain any 
‘Declaration of Competences’,11 and thus there is no indication as to which part of the WTO 
Agreement (and its covered agreements) binds the Union and which the Member States. In 
other words, there is no express delimitation of their respective responsibility in relation to 
the performance of WTO obligations.12  
 
Against this silence in the WTO Agreement, the general rules of international responsibility as 
codified by the International Law Commission 13  provide that the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act entailing international responsibility depends on the twin 
conditions of breach of an international obligation and attribution of conduct.14 Applying this 
to our case-study raises, in turn, two questions: (i) how to apportion international obligations 
as between the EU and its Member States under a ‘mixed’ treaty such as the WTO 
Agreement; and (ii) when may conduct15 of the EU Member States which violates WTO law 
be attributed to the Union (and vice-versa). A sticky point in the discussions leading up to the 
drafting of the DARIO was, however, whether the ‘rules of the organisation’ –and in 
particular, the internal delimitation of powers– should play a role in determining the 
respective international responsibility of an international organisation and its members. While 
it is not the purpose of this chapter to paint a complete portrait of this theoretical debate,16 
                                                        
9For a detailed discussion, see inter alia J.H. Bourgeois, ‘The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an 
Echternach Procession’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 763; A. Burnside, ‘The Scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy Post Opinion 1/94: Clouds and Silver Linings’ in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The 
General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet&Maxwell, 2000); N. Emiliou, ‘The Death of Exclusive 
Competences?’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 2 (1996) 294. 
10 Article XI:1 WTO Agreement, reads: “The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and 
for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become original Members of the 
WTO.” 
11 For a critical review, see A. Delgado Casteleiro, ‘EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: 
A Useful Reference Base?’ (2012) 17(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 491; J. Heliskoski, ‘EU Declarations of 
Competence and International Responsibility’ in E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility 
of the European Union – European and International Perspectives (Hart, 2013).  
12 Cf with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Annex IX, 
Articles 5 and 6, whereby the extent of the respective powers of an international organisation and its member 
States (as notified under the Convention) determines the extent of their respective responsibilities for breaches 
of the Convention.  
13 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annexed to UNGA Res 56/83, UN 
Doc A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001 [hereinafter, ARS]; and DARIO (n 2 above). 
14 Article 2 ARS; Article 4 DARIO. 
15 In this paper, the term ‘conduct’ is interchangeably used with the term ‘measure’, which in the context of the 
WTO dispute settlement system equally means ‘any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member’: US – 
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, 
para 81. 
16  See further, J. d’ Aspremont, ‘A European Law of International Responsibility? The Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations and the EU’ in V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris and V. Tzevelekos (eds.), 
The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart, 2014); F. Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating against the European Union and Its 
Member States – Who Responds under the ICL’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International 
Organizations?’ (2010) 21(3) European Journal of International Law 723; E. Paasivirta and P. J. Kuijper, ‘Does One 
Size Fit All? The European Community and the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2005) XVVI 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 169; S. Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organisations: Does the 
the main contrasting positions will be briefly outlined below as a backdrop to the subsequent 
analysis of practice in the WTO dispute settlement system.  
 
2.2 Question of Apportionment of Obligations 
 
As they currently stand, the general rules of international responsibility do not specifically 
address the question of determining the respective obligations of an international organisation 
and its members in cases where both are parties to an international treaty, such as the WTO 
Agreement for the EU and its Member States.17 In this respect, the European Commission’s 
position, as elaborated in its submissions on the DARIO to the ILC, has been that the 
question of apportionment of international obligations should be “entirely determined by the 
rules of the organisation, since these rules define the tasks and powers of the organisation 
which possesses its own international legal personality, vis-à-vis those of the member 
States.”18 Moreover, the EU takes the view that apportionment of obligations “is really the 
primary question” and should be clearly distinguished from the secondary question of 
attribution of conduct.19  
 
Applying this line of reasoning to the case of the WTO, this would mean looking at EU rules 
on the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) powers in order to determine whether a 
particular WTO obligation has been entered into by the Union or its Member States. 
However, given the dynamic and blurry delineation of external competences, it is hardly 
realistic to expect WTO dispute settlement organs to engage with such complex questions of 
EU law, nor does it seem desirable from the perspective of safeguarding the ‘autonomy’ of 
the EU legal order.20 Arguably, this issue has now become less complicated with the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 21  by virtue of which the Union has acquired exclusive 
external competence for quasi all matters presently regulated by WTO law.22 Following the 
Commission’s view, this would imply that, as the sole bearer of WTO obligations in a post-
Lisbon setting, only the EU is capable of incurring international responsibility in the WTO. If 
this is so, there would be no need to consider the question of attribution: for the 
Commission, it is impossible that a wrongful act can still be attributed to the EU Member 
States, once it has been established they are no longer carriers of the relevant WTO 
                                                                                                                                                                      
European Community require Special Treatment?’ in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in 
memory of Oscar Schachter (Matinus Nijhoff, 2005).  
17 See Article 11 DARIO; Articles 12-13 ARA. 
18  ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organisations – Comments and Observations received from 
International Organisations’, Doc A/CN.4/545, dated 25 July 2004 [hereinafter DARIO Comments 2004], at 26 
(para. 2). This seems also the view taken by Advocate General Mischo in Case C – 13/00 Commission v Ireland 
[2002] ECR I-2923, para. 30 of the Opinion; as well as by Paasivirta and Kuijper (2005), at 216.   
19DARIO Comments (2004), at 26 (para. 3). 
20 For a similar view, see Eeckhout (2006), at 9.  
21 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU. 
22 Except for transport services (Article 207(5) TFEU). With regards to the TRIPS Agreement, see Case C-
414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, judgement of 18 July 2013 (not yet reported), paras. 45-61, 
where the Court upheld the Commission’s view that, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
TRIPS Agreement as a whole now falls within the EU’s exclusive external competence under the CCP, even 
though the specific subject of patentability at issue (Article 27 TRIPS) is covered by shared competence in the 
field of the internal market (Articles 114 and 118 TFEU). See generally, P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2011), chapter 2; and F. Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union’s Common 
Commercial Policy a year after Lisbon—Sea Change or Business as Usual?’ in P. Koutrakos (ed), The European 
Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon (CLEER Working Paper 2011/3), at 83-84.  
obligations.23 Even if one accepts that this proposition is true as a matter of EU (competence) 
law, it is not equally valid under public international law.24  
From an international law perspective, so long as both the EU and its Member States remain 
parties to the WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), the presumption is that they are 
each bound by all obligations therein25 and may not invoke internal rules as justification for 
non-performance,26 unless it is otherwise agreed in the treaty or in situations covered by 
Article 46 VCLTIO. However, as already mentioned, there is no ‘Declaration of 
Competences’ or any other textual basis in the WTO Agreement for apportioning obligations 
and responsibility as between the EU and its Member States.27 In addition, it is doubtful that 
Article 46 VCLTIO could be invoked in this case:28 given the ambiguity as to the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States prevailing at the time when the WTO 
Agreement was concluded, a violation of the rules of the organisation could not have been 
“manifest” (i.e., objectively evident) to third parties. 29  Consequently, the majority of the 
                                                        
23 DARIO Comments (2004), at 26, para. 4-5, applying this reasoning to customs matters.   
24 See on this point, Advisory Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C – 53/96 Hermes International v. 
FHT Marketing [1998] ECR I-3603, para. 14: “This is how matters stand on the Community side but it must not 
be forgotten that both the Community and the Member States signed all the WTO agreements and are therefore 
contracting parties vis-à-vis contracting non-member States. And while it is true that the approval of those 
agreements on behalf of the Community is restricted to ‘matters within its competence’, it is also true that the 
Final Act and the WTO Agreement contain no provisions on competence and the Community and its Member 
States are cited as original members of equal standing. In these circumstances, it should be recognised that the 
Member States and the Community constitute, vis-à-vis contracting non-member States, a single contracting 
party or at least contracting parties bearing equal responsibility in the event of failure to implement the 
agreement. This clearly means that, in that event, the division of competence is a purely internal matter.” 
25 This flows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, 21 March 1986 
(not yet in force) [hereinafter, VCLTIO].  
26 Article 27 VCLTIO. 
27 The only caveat to be noted in this regard is the GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments: the EU Schedule 
currently in force only covers the 12 Member States in 1994, while those that have later acceded to the EU have 
their own Schedules. See, WTO, ‘European Communities and Their Member States – Schedule of Specific 
Commitments’ (GATS/SC/31), dated 15 April 1994; and for the Services Schedules of the other 16 EU 
Member States: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm.  
Following these successive enlargements, the EU has entered into negotiations on compensatory adjustment 
with other WTO members pursuant to Article V:5 GATS. However, the resulting Consolidated Schedule of 
Specific Commitments of the EU and its Member States has not yet entered into force: see WTO, 
‘Communication from the European Communities and its Member States – Draft Consolidated GATS 
Schedule’ (S/C/W/273), dated 9 October 2006. Accordingly, at the time of writing, the 16 Member States that 
acceded to the EU after 1994 are still bound by their individual Schedules of Specific Commitments, which has 
implications not only for their market access obligations (Article XVI GATS), but also other obligations in the 
GATS that are applicable only to the extent that a WTO member has undertaken specific commitments in its 
Schedule (notably, Article XVII GATS on national treatment, as well as e.g., Article VI:1 and VI:5 GATS on 
domestic regulation).  
28 Article 46(2) VCLTIO provides: “An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of 
fundamental importance.” Article 46(3) VCLTIO further states: “A violation is manifest if it would be objectively 
evident to any State or any international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the 
normal practice of States and, where appropriate, of international organizations and in good faith.” (emphasis 
added).  
29 For a similar view, see Eeckhout (2006), at 3 noting that, due to the sequence of events, some WTO members 
may in fact have signed and approved the WTO Agreement before Opinion 1/94 was delivered; and E. 
Steinberger, ‘The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s and the Member States’ 
Membership of the WTO’ (2006) 17(4) European Journal of International Law 837, at 842-848 and 856-857. For a 
different view, see M Björklund, ‘Responsibility of the EC and the Member States for Mixed Agreements – 
Should Non-Member Parties Care? (2001) 70(30) Nordic Journal of International Law 373, at 388-402. For a 
criticism, see L. Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (OUP, 2005), at 153.  
academic literature adopts the view that the EU and its Member States are jointly bound by 
all provisions of WTO law.30 But does this mean there would be joint responsibility of the 
EU and its Member States for breaches of WTO law in each and every case? That is not a 
foregone conclusion: being bound by the same WTO obligation is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States.31 In the 
logic of the system of international responsibility as codified by the ILC, breach of an 
obligation needs to be supplemented by attribution, and therefore the key question is whether 
the WTO-infringing conduct is attributable to the EU and/or its Member States.  
 
2.3 Question of Attribution of Conduct 
 
Unlike for the issue of apportionment, the general rules of international responsibility deal 
specifically with the attribution of conduct to an international organisation. 32  Article 6 
DARIO provides that conduct of an organ or agent of an international organisation shall be 
attributed to it, while Article 7 DARIO extends such an attribution to the organisation for the 
conduct of an organ of a State in cases where it is ‘placed at the disposal of’ the organisation 
and if the latter exercises ‘effective control’ over such conduct. However, the European 
Commission and some scholars have argued that these attribution rules are not flexible 
enough to accommodate the distinctive traits of the Union’s constitutional structure and 
functioning.33  
 
This concern is not entirely misplaced, as applying the DARIO rules on attribution to the 
EU/MS relationship would limit the situations in which the Union incurs (sole) responsibility 
for breaches of WTO law.34 Due to the multilevel and decentralised implementation of most 
areas of EU law (i.e., so-called ‘executive federalism’),35 EU organs directly implement only a 
limited (even if important) segment of the common commercial policy (CCP) –i.e., trade 
defence measures,36 which are clearly attributable to the Union via Article 6 DARIO. For 
other areas of the CCP, the Union is largely dependent on its Member States to execute EU 
                                                        
30  See inter alia, M. Cremona, ‘External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed 
Agreements, International Responsibility and Effects of International Law, EUI Working Papers Law No 
2006/22; G. Gaja, ‘The European Community’s Rights and Obligations under Mixed Agreements’ in D. 
O’Keeffe and H.G. Schermers (eds.), Mixed Agreements (Kluwer, 1983); E. Neframi, ‘International Responsibility 
of the European Community and of Member States under Mixed Agreements’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The 
European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer, 2002); J. Heliskoski, ‘Joint Competence of the 
European Community and its Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade 
Organization’ (1999–2000) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 80; A. Rosas, ‘The European Union and 
International Dispute Settlement” in L. Boisson de Chazournes, C. Romano and R. Mackenzie (eds.) International 
Organisations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects (Brill, 2002).  
31  A. Nollkaemper, ‘Joint Responsibility between the EU and Member States for Non-Performance of 
Obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ in E. Morgera (ed.) The External Environmental Policy of 
the European Union: EU and International Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 330.  
32 Chapter II DARIO. 
33 See e.g., Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 69.  
34 Note, however, that Chapter IV DARIO provides for a number of situations in which the responsibility of an 
international organization may arise in connection with the act of a State, presumably without attribution, 
including where the international organization “aids or assist a State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act (Article 14) or “circumvents one of its international obligations” through decisions or 
authorizations addressed to its members (Article 17), which could arguably be applicable to the EU/MS 
relationship. However, unlike Articles 6-7 DARIO where responsibility through attribution seems to be a ‘black-
or-white’ question (i.e., either the organization or the State), Chapter IV DARIO appears to create an additional 
layer of responsibility for the organization without prejudice to that of the State (Article 19), leading therefore to 
joint responsibility. See further, Hoffmeister (2010), at 727 and Nollkaemper (2013), at 323-324. 
35 On this so-called ‘executive federalism’, see R. Schütze, ‘From Rome to Lisbon: ‘Executive Federalism’ in the 
(new) European Union’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1385. 
36 Article 291(2) TFEU; see Hoffmeister (2010), at 740.  
law, and thus national authorities are likely to be more visible to third parties as the factual 
actor of an alleged WTO breach. Customs administration constitutes the most obvious 
example of this special character of the Union’s ‘executive federalism’: even though this is a 
core EU exclusive competence, there is no EU customs service but 28 national customs 
administrations that implement (directly applicable) EU customs legislation.  
As the European Commission aptly noted in its comments to the ILC, “[t]he fact that the 
implementation of [EU] law, even in areas of its exclusive competence, is normally carried 
out by the member States and their authorities, poses the question as to … when the [EU] as 
such is responsible not only for acts committed by its organs, but also for actions of the 
member States and their authorities.”37 Yet, it is commonly accepted that Article 7 DARIO 
does not provide an appropriate basis for attributing acts of the Member States when 
implementing EU law to the Union: its ‘normative control’38 over Member States’ conduct is 
generally considered to fall short of the ‘effective control’ test in that provision. 39 
Alternatively, the EU would need to constantly rely on the exception provided for in Article 9 
DARIO so as to ‘acknowledge and adopt’ conduct of its Member States as its own.40  
 
That being so, it is understandable to some extent that the European Commission pressed for 
a special rule of attribution of internationally wrongful acts during the ILC codification 
process,41 which was initially opposed by the Special Rapporteur Gaja and eventually led to 
the introduction of Article 64 DARIO on lex specialis, leaving open the possibility that the 
general rules on responsibility may be set aside in the case of the EU and its Member States.42 
As seen earlier for the question of apportionment, the EU equally considers that attribution 
of conduct should reflect the internal division of competences. Drawing on its statements in 
the WTO case EC – Computer Equipment (1998) discussed below,43 the Commission posits that 
acts of Member States’ authorities when implementing EU law in a field of EU exclusive 
(external) competence should be attributed to the Union itself.44 According to Hoffmeister, 
this would logically follow from Article 2(1) TFEU given that, in areas of exclusive EU 
                                                        
37 DARIO Comments (2004), at 29 (para. 3).  
38 Hoffmeister (2010), at 742, suggests that there are two conditions for determining ‘normative control’ of the 
Union for the purpose of international responsibility: (i) EU law governs the substantive legality of Member 
State action; (ii) this is ultimately controlled by the EU judiciary. This approach is borrowed by Kuijper and 
Paasivirta (2013), at 55; and Nollkaemper (2013), at 335. 
39  ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, with Commentaries’ (2011), 
Commentary to Article 7, reflecting it was mainly intended to codify rules on the responsibility of international 
organizations for military operations using forces of its members. See also, Hoffmeister (2010), at 726-727; 
Nollkaemper (2013), at 331. Kuijper and Paasivirta (2005), at 192, are further critical of the suggestion that, in 
cases where Member States’ authorities implement EU law, such organs are ‘placed at the disposal’ of the EU: 
this “grates the ears of the average [EU] lawyer, since it is inherent in the [EU] legal order, and in particular in 
the primacy of [EU] law, that Member States’ legislative, administrative and judicial organs carry out and 
implement [EU] law.” 
40 Article 9 DARIO provides: “Conduct which is not attributable to an international organization under articles 
6 to 8 shall nevertheless be considered an act of that organization under international law if and to the extent 
that the organization acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.” For a criticism, see 
Paasivirta and P.J. Kuijper (2005), at 217. 
41 For a more detailed account, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 728-729.  
42 Article 64 DARIO provides: “These draft articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of an international organization … are governed by special rules of international law. Such special 
rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable to the relations between an 
international organization and its members.” (emphasis added). The commentary thereto explicitly records that 
there is a variety of opinions concerning the possible existence of a special rule with respect to the attribution to 
the EU of conduct of the Member States when they implement binding acts of the Union. For a more detailed 
account, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 728-729.  
43 See section 3.2 below for further discussion.  
44 DARIO Comments (2004), at 29 (para. 5).  
(external) competence such as the CCP, “only the Union may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the 
Union or for the implementation of Union acts.” 45  Indeed, a number of scholars have 
suggested that, if necessary, Article 64 DARIO should be invoked to defend this competence-
based approach to attribution and international responsibility.46  
 
The problem of attribution of Member States’ conduct to the Union should be further 
refined, though. In support of its position, the Commission often relies on the example of 
customs legislation, which is a purely external matter and extensively harmonised though EU 
Regulations that are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the Member States.47 
Put differently, EU customs legislation clearly orders what the Member States have to do and 
they have no choice but to implement it. In these particular circumstances where Member 
States’ conduct is strictly confined to implementing EU law, it is not difficult to accept that 
national customs authorities act de facto as organs of the Union. Yet, this perfect example of 
EU executive federalism is not necessarily applicable to all areas covered by WTO law. Part 
of the reason for this is that the exclusive EU external competence under the CCP is not fully 
matched by an exclusive competence to regulate internally. As Eeckhout rightly suggests, the 
taxation of products provides a case in point: externally, such taxation is subject to Article III 
GATT falling under exclusive EU external competence, whereas internally Member States 
retain competence for certain forms of taxation that are not harmonised or even regulated at 
EU level.48 When Member States impose such taxes through independent national legislation, 
can they still be regarded as functionally acting as organs of the Union?  
 
Similar doubts may arise in other ‘grey areas’ where, even though Member States do act 
within the scope of EU law, the degree of the Union’s normative control over their conduct 
is more limited than in the context of implementing EU Regulations. One example is State 
aid, which is subject to WTO disciplines on subsidies: unlike ‘classical’ executive federalism, 
EU Member States are not here acting to execute a certain harmonised EU rule, but rather 
individually providing aid within certain boundaries set by EU law.49 In addition, the link 
between Member States’ conduct and EU law may not always be straightforward when they 
act to implement EU Directives, as these are only binding with respect to the aim(s) pursued 
but leave some discretion as to the form and method of implementation,50 and thus a varied 
application is likely to result across EU Member States. Moreover, particularly in the fields of 
consumer and environmental protection, it is not uncommon for the EU to adopt so-called 
minimum harmonisation Directives setting out standards that national legislations must meet 
but may exceed if a given Member State so desires:51 one significant example in light of the 
on-going WTO dispute Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging 52  are the UK and Irish (draft) 
                                                        
45 Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(e) TFEU; Hoffmeister (2010), at 743. 
46 Kuijper and E. Paasivirta (2013), at 69; and Hoffmeister (2010), at 745-746.  
47 Article 288 TFEU. 
48Eeckhout (2006), at 10. 
49 Articles 107 (2) and (3) TFEU stipulate the conditions under which State aid, otherwise prohibited under 
Article 107(1) TFEU, may be considered “compatible with the internal market”. Article 108 TFEU empowers 
the Commission to assess and control the compatibility of State aid granted by the Member States with the 
internal market. In particular, Article 108(3) TFEU requires Member States, as a general rule, to notify new State 
aid measures to the Commission and they may only put these measures into effect after obtaining the 
Commission’s approval. However, there are some exceptions to this requirement of prior notification/approval 
(e.g., State aid covered by the so-called ‘Block Exemption’ Regulations and de minimis aid). For an overview, see 
P. Craig and G. de Bùrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 5th edition, 2011), 1087-
1106. 
50 Article 288 TFEU. 
51 This is in line with Articles 169(4) and 193 TFEU. 
52 Australia — Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
legislations on standardised packaging of tobacco products, 53  which go beyond the 
requirements of the EU Tobacco Products Directive.54 The question thus arises as to whether 
such a restricted EU normative authority over Member States’ conduct may be enough to 
attribute it to the Union for the purposes of international responsibility.55  
 
Against this background, the next section turns to analyse how the WTO dispute settlement 
has tackled the joint membership of the EU and its Member States. To what extent have 
these theoretical questions of responsibility been a controversial issue in practice? Or 
conversely, have third parties in the WTO de facto accepted the EU’s assertion of exclusive 
responsibility for breaches of WTO law, even by its Member States?  
 
3) EU/MS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WTO – A 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE IN PRACTICE? 
 
3.1. The Broad Picture  
 
As reflected in Table 1 below, the ‘mixed’ EU/MS membership of the WTO has been hardly 
visible in dispute settlement practice. 
 
Table 1 – EU/MS Practice in WTO Dispute Settlement (1995 – 2015) 
 
 Complainant Respondent Third Party Total 
EU  
(individual claims) 
95 6856 149 312 
EU/MS  
(joint/parallel claims) 
- 1457 - 14 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Procedural Arrangement between Australia and Ukraine, Honduras, 
the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Indonesia, WT/DS434/12, WT/DS435/17, WT/DS441/16, 
WT/DS458/15, WT/DS467/16, dated 28 April 2014. 
53  WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification by the United Kingdom’ 
(G/TBT/N/GBR/24) dated 3 September 2014; ‘Notification by Ireland’ (G/TBT/N/IRL/1) dated 17 June 
2014. 
54 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and 
sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC [2014] L127/1. Article 24(2) 
specifically allows that Member States may introduce further requirements in relation to the standardisation of 
the packaging of tobacco products, provided they are justified on grounds of public health, are proportionate 
and are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
55 This seems to be the position taken by Hoffmeister (2010), at 746, suggesting the following special rule of 
attribution: “The conduct of a State that executes the law or acts under the normative control of a regional 
economic integration organization may be considered an act of that organization under international law, taking 
account of the nature of the organization’s external competence and its international obligations in the field 
where the conduct occurred.” (emphasis added).  
56 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the EU sole responsibility was invoked 
by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ (i.e., this being the first step in 
WTO dispute settlement procedures; Article 4 DSU) addressed exclusively to the EU. Note, however, that in 
some of these cases, a ‘mutually agreed solution’ was reached by parties to the dispute, while a considerable 
number of other cases have been formally pending for years at consultations stage.  
57 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the ‘joint’ responsibility of the EU and 
its Member States was invoked by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ 
addressed to the EU jointly with one or more of its Member States (e.g., WT/DS375-377, European Communities 
and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products), and those addressed to the EU in 
parallel to claims on the same subject-matter addressed to MS (e.g., WT/DS62, EC – Customs Classification of 
Computer Equipment, in which the US also brought separate claims against Ireland (WT/DS68) and the UK 
(WT/DS67)). 
MS 
(individual claims) 
158 1059 - 11 
 
At a first glance, the EU undoubtedly stands out as one of the most active users of the WTO 
dispute settlement system: out of the total 496 disputes that have been brought for resolution 
to the WTO since 1995,60 the Union (alone) has participated either as a complainant (95), a 
respondent (68) or third party (149) in 312 of them. By way of comparison, the United States 
(US), as the other key player in the WTO dispute settlement system, has participated in a total 
of 354 WTO cases.61 In contrast, the EU Member States (individually) have played a minimal 
and passive role in WTO dispute settlement:62 to date, none has initiated a dispute against a 
third country63 or intervened as a third party in any WTO case, while only some have been 
occasionally targeted as individual respondents by another WTO member (i.e., the US in all 
10 cases).64    
 
However, for the purpose of our discussion, it appears pertinent to examine more in depth 
the statistics concerning passive litigation –i.e., EU/MS acting as a respondent jointly or 
individually– as an indicator of how the question of EU/MS international responsibility has 
been approached by third parties and dispute settlement organs in the WTO. In doing so, it 
seems also interesting to break down such statistics into the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon 
period65 as a means to gauging whether, and if so how, the internal transfer of exclusive 
                                                        
58 See n 63 below 
59 This number reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ addressed only to individual EU Member States (see n 
64 below), even though the EU may have intervened as a party to negotiate a ‘mutually agreed solution’ to the 
dispute (see nn 82-83 below).  
60  See WTO, ‘Chronological List of Dispute Cases’, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, last visited 16 June 2015.  
61  See WTO, ‘Disputes by Country/Territory’, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last visited 16 June 2015.  
62 The lack of active litigation by EU Member States in the WTO dispute settlement system may be due to 
purely political/institutional reasons, but may also be explained by legal constraints resulting from EU law, and 
in particular the duty of cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU): for a discussion, see Delgado Casteleiro and Larik 
(2013), at 242 and 251-252. 
63 To date, the only EU Member State to have initiated WTO dispute settlement procedures is Denmark, but in 
respect of the Faroe Island and against the EU: European Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, Request 
for Consultations by Denmark in respect of the Faroe Island, WT/DS469/1, dated 7 November 2013. On 21 
August 2014, the parties informed the Dispute Settlement Body that the matter raised in this dispute was settled: 
European Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, Joint Communication from Denmark in respect of the 
Faroe Island and the European Union, WT/DS469/3, dated 25 August 2014.  
64 Namely: Belgium (Belgium — Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory Services, Request for Consultations 
by the United States, WT/DS80/1, dated 13 May 1997; Belgium — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting 
Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS127/1, dated 11 May 1998; Belgium — 
Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS210/1, dated 19 October 2000); Denmark (Denmark — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS83/1, 21 May 1997); France (France — 
Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS131/1, 
dated 11 May 1998); Greece (Greece — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations 
by the United States, WT/DS129/1, dated 11 May 1998); Ireland (Ireland — Certain Income Tax Measures 
Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS130/1, dated 11 May 1998); 
Netherlands (Netherlands — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations, 
WT/DS128/1, dated 11 May 1998); Portugal (Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property, Request for 
Consultations by the United States, WT/DS37/1, dated 6 May 1996) Sweden (Sweden — Measures Affecting the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS86/1, dated 2 
June 1997). 
65 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. Thus, in 
Table 2, ‘pre-Lisbon’ period refers to all WTO disputes initiated between 1 January 1995 and 1 January 2008, 
whereas ‘post-Lisbon period’ to those initiated between 1 January 2008 and 1 March 2015. The underlying 
competence to the EU for all CCP matters has affected the approach to EU/MS international 
responsibility in the practice of WTO dispute settlement.  
 
3.2. Pre-Lisbon Practice – Pragmatic Approach to EU (exclusive) Responsibility 
A glimpse at Table 2 below would seem to support the view that, “[i]n fact, the whole 
discussion on the [joint responsibility] of the EU and its Member States in the WTO is put 
aside in favour of the sole responsibility of the Union in the WTO dispute settlement 
system”,66 particularly during the pre-Lisbon period. 
 
Table 2 – EU/MS as Respondents in WTO Dispute Settlement (1995 – 2015)  
 
 Respondent Pre-Lisbon Respondent Post-Lisbon 
EU (individual claims) 54 14 
EU/MS  
(joint/separate claims) 
5 9 
MS (individual claims) 10 0 
 
Evidently, the vast majority of WTO disputes (54) during the pre-Lisbon period were brought 
against the EU alone. In all instances, the Union (through the European Commission) has 
been eager to come forward as lead litigant and to assume exclusive responsibility for all alleged 
breaches of WTO law, including in the field of the TRIPS agreement that still fell within 
EU/MS shared competence at that time.67 Yet, one should not be bewildered by this wide 
targeting of the EU as single respondent, given that most of these complaints concerned only 
legal acts of the EU institutions,68 which are clearly attributable to the Union pursuant to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
assumption made here is that, in these latter cases, the Lisbon-based change in the internal division of EU/MS 
external competences for trade matters could have influenced the approach to international responsibility at the 
consultations stage or/and in Panel/Appellate Body proceedings.  
66 Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), at 238. 
67 Notably: European Communities — Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs, Report of the Panel, WT/DS174/R, adopted 20 April 2005, paras. 7.97-7.98 and 7.722-7.727, 
involving TRIPS claims against Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 and related implementing and 
enforcement measures, and where the Panel accepted the EU’s explanation of “what amounts to its sui generis 
domestic constitutional arrangements that [EU] laws are generally not executed through authorities at [EU] level 
but rather through recourse to the authorities of its Member States which, in such a situation, act as de facto 
organs of the [EU] for which the EU would be responsible under WTO law and international law in general.” 
This allowed the Panel to refute the US allegation that there was an infringement of the most-favoured-nation 
treatment obligation in Article 4 TRIPS, when EU Member States are executing the Union-wide system on the 
protection of geographical indications as established by the challenged EU Regulation. However, this case did 
not directly address the question of EU/MS international responsibility, as the US raised violation claims against 
the EU only, and no specific measure by the EU Member States was identified.  
68 With the exception of the following disputes: European Communities — Trade Description of Scallops, Notification 
of Mutually Agreed Solution from Canada and the European Union, WT/DS7/12, dated 19 July 1996 and 
European Communities — Trade Description of Scallops, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from Peru, Chile 
the European Union, WT/DS12/12, WT/DS14/11, dated 19 July 1996, concerning a French Order on the 
official names and permitted trade descriptions of scallops in France; European Communities — Measures Affecting 
Butter Products, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from New Zealand and the European Union, 
WT/DS72/7, dated 18 November 1999, concerning decisions by the European Commission and the United 
Kingdom’s Customs and Excise Department excluding certain types of New Zealand’s butter from eligibility for 
its country-specific tariff quota established in the EU’s Schedule; European Communities — Certain Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Communication from Canada, WT/DS369/3, dated 3 
December 2014, concerning certain measures taken by Belgium and the Netherlands regarding the importation, 
transportation, manufacturing, marketing and sale of seal products and withdrawn following repeal of such 
measures. In addition, see cases discussed (n 70, 73 and 74 below). 
Article 6(1) DARIO.69 Nonetheless, in some cases, claims directed against the EU alone have 
involved also measures of its Member States, not only when implementing EU law sensu stricto, 
but when acting under the normative umbrella of the EU in a broader sense. A well-known 
example is the EC – Biotech Products (2006) dispute, where the contested measures included 
national safeguard measures prohibiting the import and/or marketing of specific biotech 
products, which had been taken by six Member States in reliance on the possibility provided 
for in the relevant EU legislation.70 Even if the degree of EU normative control in respect of 
these safeguard measures was somehow restricted (i.e., to authorisation),71 the WTO panel 
accepted the EU standing as single respondent and bearing sole responsibility for these 
measures, based on two ‘pragmatic’ considerations:  
“It is important to note that even though the member State safeguard measures were 
introduced by the relevant member States and are applicable only in the territory of 
the member States concerned, the [EU] as a whole is the responding party in respect 
of the member State safeguard measures. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the 
Complaining Parties have directed their complaints against the [EU], and not individual [EU] 
member States. The [EU] never contested that, for the purposes of this dispute, the 
challenged member State measures are attributable to it under international law and hence can 
be considered [EU] measures …”72 
 
In support of this pragmatic approach, the Panel referred to the earlier EC – Asbestos (2001) 
case, where the EU was targeted as sole defendant –and potentially sole responsible if a 
breach of the WTO law had been established (quod non)– of the challenged French decree 
banning asbestos and asbestos-containing products, even though the link between this 
national measure and EU legislation was not readily obvious.73 Another less cited but also 
important case is EC – Commercial Vessels (2005) concerning the ‘grey area’ of state aid. Here, 
the challenged measures included national aid schemes adopted by five EU Member States 
pursuant to an EU Regulation (providing for a temporary defensive mechanism for the 
                                                        
69 It suffice to cite the well-known WT/DS26 and WT/DS48 European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones) involving (inter alia) claims under GATT, SPS, TBT against Council Directive (EEC) 
No 602/81, Council Directive (EEC) No 146/88 and Council Directive (EEC) No 299/88; WT/DS27 European 
Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, involving (inter alia) claims under the 
GATT, GATS and Import Licensing Agreement against Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93; WT/DS265, 
WT/DS266 and WT/283 European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar, involving claims under the 
Agriculture and SCM Agreements against Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 and related measures; as well 
as various WTO cases concerning EU trade defence measures (e.g., WT/DS141 European Communities — Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, involving claims under the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
and WT/DS326 and WT/DS328 European Communities — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Salmon, involving claims 
under the Agreement on Safeguards). 
70 European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS291/DS/292/DS293/R, adopted 21 November 2006 [hereinafter, EC – Biotech Products], paras. 2.1-2.5. 
71 See Article 23 of Directive (EC) No 2001/18 and Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 258/97 permitting, under 
certain conditions, EU Member States to adopt safeguard measures in respect of biotech products that have 
obtained approval for EU-wide marketing. In such cases, the Member State concerned must inform other EU 
Member States and the Commission of the action it has taken and a decision on the safeguard measure must 
then be taken at EU level within a prescribed time period. However, it has been reported that the safeguard 
measures at issue in this dispute had not been approved by the EU, nor had the European Commission open 
infringement procedures against the Member States concerned, which in practice were arguably free from EU’s 
normative control: see, A. Delgado Casteleiro, The International Responsibility of the European Union: From Competence 
to Normative Control (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2011), at 200. 
72 Panel Report in EC – Biotech Products (2006), para. 7.101 (emphasis added).  
73  European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS/135/R, adopted (as modified) 5 April 2001 [hereinafter, EC – Asbestos], paras. 3.32-3.35. While the EU 
had adopted a series of Directives on the matter since 1980, it was only in May 1999 (i.e., 3 years after the 
adoption of the French decree) that it decided to introduce an EU-wide ban on all types asbestos (including 
chrysotile asbestos at issue) with effect from 1 January 2005.   
shipbuilding sector), which had been explicitly authorised by the European Commission. 74 
After formally noting that Korea had made the panel request with respect to the European 
Union only,75 the Panel accepted the EU’s sole responsibility for the national aid schemes, 
emphasising two key elements: (i) the EU Regulation and Commission’s decisions were the 
“legal authority” under which EU Member States provided aid; and (ii) in the event of a 
finding of WTO-inconsistency, the EU had declared to assume responsibility for “any actions 
that may be required to bring into conformity the measures at issue”, removing thereby the 
“legal basis for granting any further aid”.76 
 
Turning to the ten WTO disputes against individual Member States, these were all brought 
(perhaps non-coincidentally) by the United States and date back to the early years of the 
WTO dispute settlement system (1995-2000). Some of these cases concerned claims under 
the GATS and TRIPS, and to some extent may be genuinely motivated by the lack of legal 
clarity, which prevailed at that time following Opinion 1/94, as to the exact division of 
competences –and thus, respective obligations– between the EU and its Member States in 
these fields of WTO law.77 However, others involved claims in areas that were unequivocally 
held in Opinion 1/94 to fully fall under EU exclusive external competence (i.e., the GATT and 
the SCM Agreement),78 and may well have been motivated by a strategic attempt to weaken 
European unity and leadership in the WTO.79 In any event, no WTO panel has pronounced 
itself on the responsibility of EU Member States in these disputes, as six of them have been 
formally pending for years at consultations stage, 80 while in the other four a ‘mutually agreed 
solution’ was reached. Nevertheless, it is significant that in all but one81 of the cases resulting 
in a ‘mutually agreed solution’, this was achieved with the EU intervening as a 
negotiating/responding party, not only for matters falling under its exclusive external 
                                                        
74 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, Report of the Panel, WT/DS301/R, 
adopted 20 June 2005 [hereinafter, EC – Commercial Vessels], paras. 7.36 – 7.51. The five EU Member States 
concerned were Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain. 
75 Ibid., para. 7.33. 
76 Ibid., paras. 7.33 and 7.53, and footnote 156. The Panel found that, “[i]n light of these elements, we would 
find it sufficient, in the circumstances of this case, to address our recommendation to bring the measures at issue 
into conformity to the [EU].”  
77 With regards to GATS claims, see: Belgium — Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory Services, Request 
for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS80/1, dated 13 May 1997. As to the TRIPS, see: Denmark — 
Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS83/1, 21 May 1997; Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property, Request for Consultations by 
the United States, WT/DS37/1, dated 6 May 1996; Sweden — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS86/1, dated 2 June 1997. 
78 With respect to the GATT, see: Belgium — Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, Request 
for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS210/1, dated 19 October 2000; With respect to the SCM 
Agreement, see: Belgium — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the 
United States, WT/DS127/1, dated 11 May 1998; France — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, 
Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS131/1, dated 11 May 1998; Greece — Certain Income Tax 
Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS129/1, dated 11 May 1998; 
Ireland — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS130/1, dated 11 May 1998; Netherlands — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for 
Consultations, WT/DS128/1, dated 11 May 1998.  
79 On this point, see S. Billiet, ‘The EC and WTO Dispute Settlement: Initiation of Trade Disputes by the EC’ 
(2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 197, at 199.  
80 This is the case of the five WTO disputes (at n 78 above) concerning claims under the SCM Agreement, as 
well as that involving GATS claims (at n 77 above).  
81 The exception being: Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property Act, Notification of a Mutually-
Agreed Solution from the United States and Portugal, WT/DS37/2, dated 8 October 1996, following a 
Portuguese Decree Law to conform with the term of patent protection required by the TRIPS Agreement.  
competence,82 but also for issues revolving around the application of the TRIPS agreement 
where the extent of its competence was not entirely clear in this pre-Lisbon setting.83  
 
Most significant for our purposes, only in a few cases (5) have third parties formally invoked 
the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for alleged breaches of WTO law, by 
targeting them together (1) or by directing parallel claims on the same subject-matter to each 
of them separately (4).84 EC – Computer Equipment (1998)85 was the first case in which the joint 
EU/MS membership of the WTO caused controversy as to who was responsible in panel 
proceedings. The case concerned the tariff treatment of certain computer equipment, which 
the US claimed was in breach of the tariff concessions contained in the EU Schedule under 
Article II:1 GATT. Thus, it typically illustrates the kind of responsibility question that may 
arise in the context of ‘classical’ EU executive federalism –i.e., who is responsible for acts of 
Member States custom authorities in situations where they functionally act as organs of the 
Union? Unsurprisingly, the EU sought to assert its exclusive responsibility for any GATT 
infringement, based on its understanding that apportionment of obligations and attribution of 
conduct in the context of international responsibility should follow the delimitation of 
competences under EU law.86 In particular, the EU stressed that it was an “original member 
of the WTO in its own right” and that the tariff concessions “were bound in the GATT 1994 
[…] exclusively at the level of the [EU] and not at the level of individual member States.”87 
Positioning itself as the only bearer of the GATT obligations in question, the EU declared its 
readiness to assume the “entire responsibility for all measures in the area of tariff 
concessions”, 88 whether the measure complained about had been taken at EU level or at the 
level of the Member States. Significantly, the Union went further to support its full 
responsibility by linking the internal division of competences with the question of who can 
remedy the alleged wrongs: “it was exclusively competent for the subject matter concerned and 
                                                        
82 Notably, Belgium — Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, Request for Consultations by 
the United States, WT/DS210/6, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from the United States and the 
European Union, dated 2 January 2002. 
83Denmark — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of a Mutually Agreed 
Solution from the United States, the European Union and Denmark, WT/DS83/2, dated 13 June 2001; and 
Sweden — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution 
from the United States, the European Union and Sweden, WT/DS86/2, dated 11 December 1998, both 
following amendments in the respective national laws to provide for provisional measures inaudita altera parte in 
civil proceedings involving intellectual property rights. 
84 In addition to the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) dispute discussed here, the other three cases in which 
parallel claims were directed against the EU and its Member States separately have resulted in a ‘mutually agreed 
solution’ or been formally pending at consultations stage for years: (i) France — Measures Relating to the Development 
of a Flight Management System, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS173/1, dated 31 May 1999; 
and European Communities — Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System, Request for 
Consultations by the United States, WT/DS172/1, dated 31 May 1999, concerning GATT and SCM claims; (ii) 
Ireland — Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights and European Communities — Measures 
Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from United 
States, the European Union and Ireland, WT/DS82/3, WT/DS115/3, dated 13 September 2002; (iii) Greece — 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs and European Communities — 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, Notification of Mutually Agreed 
Solution from the United States, the European Union and Greece, WT/DS124/2, WT/DS125/2, dated 26 
March 2001.  
85 European Communities — Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, Report of the Panel, WT/DS62/R, 
WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted (as modified) 22 June 1998 [hereinafter, EC – Computer Equipment).  
86 See section 2 above. 
87Panel Report in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), para. 4.10.  
88 Oral Pleading of the European Communities to the Panel in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), 12 June 1997, 
para. 6. 
thus the only entity in a position to repair the possible breach”89 –i.e., the only entity capable of 
ensuring the necessary restitution under WTO dispute settlement rules.90 
 
The US, on the other hand, submitted that both the EU and two of its Member States were 
responsible for the allegedly wrongful tariff treatment, arguing that Ireland and the UK were 
“independent members” of the WTO and equally bound by the EU Schedule under the 
GATT.91 For the US, the internal transfer of powers for tariff matters from the Member 
States to the EU was irrelevant externally, and did not result in “fewer rights and obligations 
being allotted to the Member States” under WTO law.92 Furthermore, the US took the view 
that the conduct of the Irish and UK customs administrations was attributable to those two 
States, emphasising that they were told during consultations with the EU that it “could not 
control the classification practices of member State customs authorities.” 93  The Panel, 
however, avoided addressing explicitly the US request to clarify the responsibility of the 
respective defendants and instead put forward compromise language that could satisfy both 
parties: “since the [European Union], Ireland and the United Kingdom are all bound by their 
tariff commitments under Schedule LXXX, our examination will focus, in the first instance, 
on whether customs authorities in the [European Union], including those located in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, have or have not deviated from the obligations assumed under that 
Schedule.”94 On the one hand, the formula ‘customs authorities in the European Union’ 
could be read as endorsing the EU’s proposition that Member States customs authorities act 
functionally as EU organs when implementing EU law,95 and thus responsibility for their 
conduct should be solely attributed to the EU.96 On the other hand, the Panel sided with the 
US in that the relevant EU Schedule was equally binding on both the EU and its Member 
States,97 presumably implying all bear international responsibility for any breaches thereof, 
even if this is an area of EU exclusive competence. Nevertheless, the Panel ultimately found 
that it was the Union alone to have “acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article II 
GATT” and addressed recommendations to the EU only.98 
 
                                                        
89 ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International 
Organizations’, Sixty-third Session, Doc A/CN.4/637, dated 14 February 2011, at 24 (emphasis added), where 
the EU clarified that it was not simply adopting Member States conduct as its own (as per Article 9 DARIO). 
90 On this point, see further section 4.1 below. 
91 Panel Report in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), para. 4.13. 
92 Ibid., para. 4.14. 
93 Ibid., para. 4.12. Originally, the US tried to establish separate parallel WTO panels against the EU and the two 
Member States, but an agreement was reached between the parties to have one panel considering all claims 
(paras 1.1-1.11).  
94 Ibid., para. 8.16.  
95 This federal-type agency argument was further advanced by the EU and accepted by the WTO panel in 
European Communities — Selected Customs Matters, Report of the Panel, WT/DS315/R, adopted (as modified) 11 
December 2006 [EC – Selected Customs Matters], paras. 7547-7553. However, this case touched only indirectly 
upon the issue of EU/MS international responsibility, given that the US violation claims under Article X:3 
GATT were only addressed against the EU, and not against the EU Member States themselves. This can be 
easily explained by the fact that the US was directly challenging the decentralised nature of the EU’s system of 
customs administration as being contrary to the uniformity and prompt dispute resolution requirements of 
Article X:3 GATT. Thus, the preliminary issue that was raised was whether the EU was able to discharge its 
obligations under Article X:3 GATT through the Member States, which the Panel found to be the case.  
96 For a similar view, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 732.  
97 This was also the position of the Panel in EC – Selected Customs Matters (2006), para. 7.548: “it would appear 
that the [EU] as well as its constituent member States concurrently bear the obligations contained in the WTO 
Agreements, including those contained in Article X:3(b) of the GATT 1994.” (emphasis added) 
98 Ibid., paras. 9.1-9.2 (emphasis added). The issue of who was the proper respondent on the EU/MS side was 
not raised again on appeal: see EC – Computer Equipment (1998), Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, para. 57. 
The other borderline case of this pre-Lisbon99 period in which the joint responsibility of the 
EU/MS was invoked and addressed by a WTO panel was the famous EC and Certain Member 
States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011),100 which was initiated by the United States back in 2004 but 
this time directing claims against the EU and four of its Member States together (Germany, 
France, Spain and the UK). The US claimed they had all provided subsidies separately and in 
parallel to Airbus large civil aircraft 101  in contravention of “their obligations” under the 
GATT and SCM Agreement.102 Again not surprisingly from an EU law standpoint, the Union 
requested that the Panel determine, as a preliminary matter, that the EU was the “only proper 
respondent” in the dispute, stressing that it was not simply “representing” the Member States 
in the proceedings, but took “full responsibility” for their actions. 103 However, the EU’s 
argumentation was essentially limited to restating that the alleged GATT/SCM violations 
related to matters within its exclusive competence and for which it bears sole responsibility in 
the WTO,104 with no indication as to how it would ensure compliance with any potentially 
adverse Panel’s recommendations also by its Member States in this specific case.  
 
The Panel rejected the EU request endorsing instead the formal argument advanced by the 
US that consultations and panel requests had been made with respect to the four Member 
States “in addition” to the EU: “[e]ach of these five is, in its own right, a Member of the 
WTO, with all the rights and obligations pertaining to such membership, including the 
obligation to respond to claims made against it by another WTO Member.”105 For the Panel, 
the ‘rules of the organisation’ –i.e., the internal division of powers– were of no relevance for 
the purpose of apportioning WTO obligations and allocating responsibility for any possible 
breach thereof between the EU and its Member States. Notably, it reasoned that the fact that 
the four Member States had chosen not to directly defend their interests in the dispute by 
making oral and written submissions separate from those of the EU was “a matter entirely 
within their discretion” and subject to their obligations under EU law, but did “not affect 
their rights or status as respondent parties” under WTO law.106 Taking this position a step 
forward, it held that: “whatever responsibility the [EU] bears for the actions of its member 
States does not diminish their rights and obligations as WTO Members, but is rather an internal matter 
concerning the relations between the [EU] and its member States.”107 Following this line of 
reasoning, the Panel determined that both the EU and the four Member States had acted 
                                                        
99 While the case was initiated in 2004, Panel and Appellate Body proceedings were only concluded in 2011.  
100 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Report of the Panel, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS316/R, adopted (as modified) 1 June 2011 [hereinafter, EC – Large Civil Aircraft]. 
101 The principal measure at issue were the so-called “Launch Aid” or “Member State Financing” (LA/MFS) 
arrangements, provided by France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom to Airbus for the development of 
large civil aircraft (LCA). Other measures challenged were: (i) Loans provided through the European Investment 
Bank to Airbus for LCA design, development, and other purposes; (iii) infrastructure and infrastructure-related 
grants to Airbus provided by Member State authorities; (iv) the provision to Airbus of equity infusions, debt 
forgiveness, and grants through government-owned and government-controlled banks; (v) research and 
technological research funding to Airbus provided by the EU and the Member States.  
102 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Request for Consultations by the United 
States, WT/DS316/1, dated 12 October 2004. 
103 Panel Report in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), paras. 7.171, requesting that the term “certain Member 
States” be dropped from the name of the case.  
104 Ibid., para. 7.169 and 7.172. See also, European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
First Written Submission by the European Communities, WT/DS316, dated 9 February 2007, p. 4 and 43, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=268&code=2#_eu-submissions.  
105 Ibid., para. 7.174. 
106 Ibid., para. 7.176. 
107 Ibid., para. 7.175. 
inconsistently with their WTO obligations and addressed recommendations accordingly –i.e., 
significantly, the first and only WTO ruling to date establishing such a joint responsibility.108  
 
3.3. Post-Lisbon Practice – Challenging EU ‘exclusive’ Responsibility? 
 
Against the backdrop of the pre-Lisbon practice just examined, it is readily apparent from 
Table 2 that joint EU/MS membership of the WTO is becoming much more visible in 
dispute settlement practice post-Lisbon –even if this may be somehow counterintuitive from 
an EU law perspective with the Union having been granted exclusive external competence for 
all CCP matters. At the outset, two main observations can be made: first, complaints 
addressed jointly to the EU and one or more of its Member States (9) are no longer the 
exception but almost as common as complaints directed against the EU alone (14); and 
second, it is no longer just the US bringing such joint complaints, but also other active players 
in the WTO dispute settlement system (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Japan and Russia). 
Out of the nine cases in which the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States has 
been formally invoked, only one109 has led to the adoption of a WTO panel report, while the 
others appear still at consultations/panel request stage.110 Therefore, it is too early to appraise 
the significance of this trend in WTO dispute settlement practice. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to note that these cases concern claims under WTO covered agreements falling 
within the ‘old’ (e.g., GATT, TBT, SCM Agreements) and ‘new’ EU exclusive external 
                                                        
108 Ibid., para. 8.5. Note, however, that the European Union did not appeal the specific issue of the proper 
respondent, and thus the Appellate Body did not have a chance to rule on it in an authoritative manner: see, 
European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Notification of Appeal by the European 
Union, WT/DS316/12, dated 23 July 2010. Ultimately, the Appellate Body addressed its recommendations to 
the EU only: “[…] request the European Union to bring its measures, found in this Report, and in the Panel 
Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, into conformity with its 
obligations under that Agreement.” (emphasis added). However, it also upheld the Panel’s recommendations to 
“the Member granting each subsidy” for those findings that were not appealed. See EC – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2011), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, paras. 1416 and 1418. 
109 European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R, adopted on 21 September 2010 [hereinafter, EC – IT 
Products]. 
110 European Union and a Member State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, Requests for Consultations by India, 
WT/DS408/1, dated 19 May 2010; and European Union and a Member State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, 
Request for Consultations by Brazil, WT/DS409/1, dated 19 May 2010, both concerning GATT and TRIPS 
claims against several EU regulations and Dutch measures for the seizure of consignments of generic drugs 
originating in India by customs authorities in the Netherlands for alleged infringement of patents while in transit 
to third-country destinations; European Union and a Member State — Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of 
Biodiesels, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, WT/DS443/5, dated 7 December 2012, 
involving GATT and TRIMS claims against a Spanish Ministerial Order governing the allocation of biodiesel 
production volumes for computing compliance with mandatory biofuel targets and supposedly adopted 
pursuant to Directive (EC) No 2009/28; European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS452/1, dated 7 November 2012, 
regarding claims under GATT, SCM and TRIMS against Italian and Greek measures supposedly taken pursuant 
to Directive (EC) No 2009/28, and including domestic content restrictions in feed-in tariff programs; European 
Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting 
the Biodiesel Industry, Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 2013, concerning 
claims under GATT, TBT, SCM and TRIMs against Directive (EC) No 2009/28 and Directive (EC) No 
2009/30 and related measures taken by several Member States, establishing sustainability criteria for biofuels and 
support schemes for the biodiesel sector; European Union and its Member States — Certain Measures Relating to the 
Energy Sector, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Russia, WT/DS476/2, dated 28 May 2015, involving 
claims under the GATT and GATS against the so-called “Third Energy Package”, and in particular Directive 
(EC) No 2009/73 establishing common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural 
gas, as well as related EU legal instruments and implementing measures by the Member States. 
competence (i.e., GATS and TRIPS) alike, and increasingly involve Member States measures 
taken in the framework of EU legislation in the field of energy and climate change policies.111  
 
At the time of writing, the issue of EU/MS joint responsibility has only been addressed by 
the WTO panel in the EC – IT Products (2010) dispute concerning the tariff treatment of 
certain information technology products, which the US, Japan and Chinese Taipei claimed 
was in breach of the EU’s and its Member States’ obligations under (inter alia) Articles II:1(a) 
and II:1(b) GATT as it did not respect their commitments to provide duty-free treatment for 
these products under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA).112 The complainants 
addressed the consultations and panel requests jointly to the EU and its Member States, on 
grounds that both the EU and its Member States played a role in the application of the duties 
concerned. The complainants submitted that, while the Union had promulgated the 
challenged measures, customs authorities of the Member States, in implementing these EU 
regulations, issued ‘Binding Tariff Information’ decisions specifying the customs classification 
code and applied customs duties to the products at issue. They further argued that the 
“internal legal relationship” between the EU and its Member States “cannot diminish the 
rights of other WTO members”, including under the DSU to bring claims against the EU 
Member States as WTO members in their own right.113  
 
However, the EU notified the Panel that it would participate as sole respondent in the 
proceedings and bear sole responsibility for any GATT breach. As in the EC – Computer 
Equipment (1998) dispute discussed above, the EU’s assertion of exclusive responsibility was 
here supported by a combination of internal and WTO-based legal arguments. As could be 
expected, the Union reiterated its exclusive competence under EU law for all tariff matters, 
arguing that the role of national customs authorities was limited to applying measures 
previously enacted at EU level. But critically, it also stressed that this meant, from a WTO law 
perspective, that only the EU could take “remedial action” to implement the Panel’s 
recommendations to the extent a GATT violation were determined, and thus “addressing any 
recommendations to each [EU] Member State would serve no useful purpose.”114 In addition, 
the Union sought to assure the Panel that the EU Member States would be required, as a 
matter of EU law, to apply any such implementing measures taken at EU level.115 The Panel 
made its recommendations to the EU only, hiding behind a rather ‘formalistic’ argument (i.e., 
an “as such” challenge), but ultimately persuaded that EU sole responsibility will bring a 
satisfactory settlement of this specific dispute:  
                                                        
111 For an overview, see T. Perišin, ‘Pending EU Disputes in the WTO: Challenges to EU Energy Law and 
Policy’ (2014) 10 Croatian Yearbook of International Law 371. On the EU ‘Climate and Energy Package’, see inter 
alia K. Kulovesi, E. Morgera and M. Muñoz, ‘Environmental Integration and Multi-Faceted International 
Dimensions of EU Law: Unpacking the EU’s 2009 Climate and Energy Package’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law 
Review 829. On the EU ‘Third Energy Package’ establishing common rules for an internal market in natural gas 
and electricity, see inter alia R. Boscheck, ‘The EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Legislative Package: Victory 
of Politics over Economic Rationality? (2009) 32(4) World Competition 593; and A. Johnston and G. Block, EU 
Energy Law (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
112 European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Request 
for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Japan and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, WT/DS375/8, WT/DS376/8, WT/DS377/6, dated 19 August 2008, which also 
includes claims under Article X GATT (publication and administration of trade regulations) by the United States 
and Chinese Taipei with regards to one of the products at issue (set-top boxes which have a communication 
function).  
113 European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September 2010 [hereinafter, EC – IT 
Products], para. 7.81. 
114 Ibid., para. 7.80. 
115 Ibid., para. 7.80. 
 “[…] we note that the complainants have framed their claims as challenging the [EU] 
measures "as such" and have confirmed to the Panel that they are not making claims 
with respect to specific applications of those measures by national customs authorities 
of any member States. Under the circumstances, the Panel considers that it is not 
required to make, and does not make, findings with respect to member States' 
application of the [EU] measures that were challenged "as such" in this dispute. 
Moreover, we are of the view that findings with respect to the measures adopted by 
the [EU] will provide a positive solution to the dispute.”116 
 
3.4. A nuanced assessment of EU (exclusive) Responsibility  
 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis of EU/MS participation 
in the WTO dispute settlement system. First, theoretical questions such as ‘who is responsible 
for what’ arising from the joint EU/MS membership of the WTO have seldom been a 
controversial issue in dispute settlement practice. In fact, the question of EU/MS 
responsibility has thus far been litigated and directly addressed only on three occasions in 
WTO panel proceedings (i.e., EC – Computer Equipment (1998), EC – IT Products (2010) and 
EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)). Second, in these few instances where EU/MS responsibility 
was contentious, what caused contention was the Union’s eagerness to be held responsible in 
lieu of its Member States, and not them seeking to hide behind each other so as to evade 
international responsibility altogether. 117 Put differently, concerns over ‘accountability gaps’ 
have not really materialised in EU/MS practice within the WTO dispute settlement system. 
That being so, in which ways does this contribution seek to offer a more nuanced assessment 
of the EU’s leading role in WTO dispute settlement vis-à-vis that found in the literature?  
 
The first qualification made here concerns the degree to which the EU’s assertion of 
exclusive participation and responsibility has been accepted by other WTO members and 
scrutinised by WTO dispute settlement organs. In this regard, it has been argued that WTO 
dispute settlement practice “has gone a long way in the direction of attributing the acts of the 
Member States to EU, in particular when the Member States implement EU law or when 
their acts fall within the scope of EU legislation.”118 Such a conclusion would seem premature 
for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen, out of the total 68 WTO disputes in which 
the EU was targeted as sole respondent, only a few actually raised this sensitive question of 
attribution of conduct of the EU Member States to the Union. Since the vast majority of 
these cases involved complaints against EU measures only –rather than specific applications 
thereof by the Member States, there was no ambiguity that the Union bore sole responsibility 
for the alleged WTO-inconsistency of such acts. 119  Second, there were certainly some 
instances, particularly in the pre-Lisbon period, in which WTO members could have 
challenged but instead tacitly accepted EU exclusive responsibility for actions of the Member 
States taken under its (limited) normative authority –notably, EC – Asbestos (2001), EC – 
Commercial Vessels (2005) and EC – Biotech (2006). And it is also true that WTO panels have 
refrained from interfering with this course of action insofar as it was acquiesced to by WTO 
members. In this sense, the approach to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO has 
been rightly described as being marked by both assertiveness of the Union and pragmatism of 
all parties involved. 120  However, this does not necessarily set a precedent for future 
                                                        
116 Ibid., para. 8.2 (emphasis added).  
117 For a similar view, see Delgado Casteliero and Larik (2013), at 255; Eeckhout (2006), at 7. 
118 Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 63; for a similar view, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 734 and 743; and Delgado 
Casteliero (2011), at 202.  
119 See notes 68 and 69 above.  
120 Delgado Casteliero and Larik (2013), at 254; Eeckhout (2006), at 7. 
disputes.121 Indeed, our examination of post-Lisbon practice reveals that WTO members have 
increasingly brought joint complaints when challenging measures adopted by the Member 
States within the normative sphere of EU law,122 and it remains to be seen how these claims 
of joint EU/MS responsibility are dealt with if actually contested in WTO panel 
proceedings.123  
 
The second refinement made here pertains to the degree to which EU competence rules have 
been considered a relevant criterion for the purpose of allocating EU/MS international 
responsibility, in the three cases in which this proved a controversial issue before WTO 
panels. In this regard, it has been rightly noted that the approach of WTO panels has not 
been entirely consistent. 124  Understandingly from an international law perspective, WTO 
panels have consistently taken the position that internal transfers of powers do not affect the 
validity of WTO obligations for EU Member States: as full WTO members in their own right, 
they are bound by the entire WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), in spite of 
whatever competence the Union may have for parts thereof as a matter of EU law.125 In other 
words, the ‘rules of the organisation’ are largely irrelevant for the question of apportioning 
WTO obligations. Conversely, the available WTO jurisprudence is less clear on the extent to 
which the ‘rules of the organisation’ may be relevant to the question of attributing acts of the 
Member States to the Union. Whereas in cases of classical EU executive federalism (i.e., EC – 
Computer Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010)) WTO panels have ultimately accepted 
the Union’s sole responsibility for acts of its Member States when implementing EU 
(customs) legislation found in violation of the GATT, the Panel in EC – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2011)) drew a line in this regard and held both the EU and its Member States responsible for 
breaches of the SCM Agreement. These different findings cannot be easily explained in light 
of the internal allocation of competences, since both the GATT and the SCM Agreement 
have long been within the exclusive external competence of the Union. Yet, as will be argued 
next, this case law may appear less inconsistent if viewed from the perspective of a WTO 
panel and its very purpose in assigning responsibility for an internationally wrongful act in the 
specific treaty context of the WTO.  
 
4) EU/MS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WTO –  
A MODEL, OR A CASE APART? 
 
4.1 A ‘Competence Model’, or a ‘Competence/Remedy Model’? 
                                                        
121 This point is further corroborated by the fact that there is no strict rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute 
settlement according to which previous rulings bind panels in subsequent cases, nor an Appellate Body decision 
on the matter that could be relied upon by future panels; see P. van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, 2013), at 51-53. 
122 On this point, see further section 4.1 below with specific reference to: European Union and Certain Member 
States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, 
Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 2013. 
123 In this context, note that the Panel in EC – IT Products (2010), para. 8.2, sounded a warning that, if necessary, 
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Responsibility in the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2013) 4(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 343, at 
352. 
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125 Panel Report in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), para. 8.16; Panel Report in EC – IT Products (2010), para. 
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In comparing the different approaches to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO 
and under the European Convention on Human Rights, Kuijper aptly qualifies the relative 
impact of the EU’s internal rules on determinations of international responsibility. He argues 
that it is not just internal factors, such as the scope of EU powers and whether the Member 
States may be seen as de facto Union organs in certain instances, which determine the degree to 
which the EU will bear sole or joint responsibility.126 Rather, these internal elements “will be 
strongly vary in impact on the final questions of attribution and responsibility” depending on 
the specific treaty regime in which the responsibility of the EU and/or its Member States is 
invoked, and in particular the prevailing remedy for an internationally wrongful act preferred 
by the regime in question.127 In the context of the WTO, both the legal texts and the practice 
of the dispute settlement organs clearly attach a strong preference for juridical restitution –
i.e., the ‘prompt’ withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-inconsistent measure and 
continued performance of WTO obligations. 128  In such a system where the primary 
consequence of international responsibility is the return to legality, the key question becomes 
who (i.e., the EU or the Member States, or both) has the actual power to undo the wrongful 
act and ensure conformity to existing WTO obligations. In this sense, as rightly pointed out 
by Nollkaemper, the role of power in determining international responsibility (whether joint 
or not) is a fundamental one.129 Put simply, why would WTO dispute settlement organs 
bother to assign responsibility to a WTO member that does not hold the power to remove 
(or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent?  
 
That being said, does it necessarily follow that the EU is the one and only able to provide for 
restitution and ensure performance of WTO obligations in all instances? This would seem to 
be the view taken by Kuijper and Paasivirta in suggesting the so-called ‘competence model’ 
for managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. In their opinion, the relevant 
WTO member is the Union and not the Member States: given the near-exclusive EU external 
competence for WTO matters post-Lisbon, only its institutions can provide for the necessary 
restitution and thus the Union should be solely responsible for the WTO-inconsistency of all 
acts taken in the sphere of EU law, including by its Member States.130 But if this proposition 
is accepted, what would be the legal justification for the Member States to remain 
independent members of the WTO, given they are claimed entirely incompetent to fulfill one 
of the key obligations of that membership –i.e., to ensure the conformity of their laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with WTO obligations131? 
 
In reality, the proposed ‘competence model’ may need some refinement, as evidenced by the 
EU’s own argumentation in the three WTO cases previously discussed in which EU/MS 
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Regimes’ (2014) SHARES Research Paper 30, at 20. 
127 Ibid., at 2.  
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elaborated in Kuijper (2014), at 8-9 and 18. A similar view is taken by Hoffmeister (2010), at 743: “Article 2(1) 
TEU expresses the rule that Member States can no longer act in such exclusive Union policies unless if so 
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131 See Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement. 
responsibility proved contentious in panel proceedings. On the one hand, the two premises 
underlying the ‘competence model’ appear perfectly sensible when applied to situations of 
classical EU executive federalism such as those posed by the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) 
and EC – IT Products (2010) disputes involving EU customs legislation. In both cases, it was 
plainly clear that: first, the EU had required the Member States to act inconsistently with WTO 
law –i.e., by adopting the challenged (directly applicable) regulations that Member States have 
no choice but to apply and which left no room for discretion in terms of implementation; and 
second, the EU was the only entity with the actual power to provide restitution –i.e., to 
modify/withdraw the regulations found WTO-inconsistent. Under these circumstances where 
the Union has full ex-ante and ex-post normative control over Member State action, it would 
not be very efficient nor provide much legal certainty from a third-party perspective, to hold 
EU Member States responsible as they do not have any individual power to undo the 
wrongful situation and ensure performance of WTO obligations.   
  
On the other hand, it is less straightforward whether these two assumptions underpinning the 
‘competence model’ can be upheld as we move away from tariffs and customs matters into 
other areas of WTO law, which are not so extensively regulated at EU level and where the 
role of the EU Member States is not strictly confined to executing EU law. This point is well 
illustrated by the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute. First, it is generally the case that, in 
the field of State aid, the EU does not require but at most authorises Member States to provide 
aid under certain conditions, 132  and therefore Member States do enjoy some level of 
discretion in whether or not they act in contravention of the SCM Agreement. Moreover, in 
this particular dispute, the EU did not point to any Commission state aid decision actually 
authorising the separate subsidies granted by the Member States,133 and it has indeed been 
reported that such subsidies were not subject to a specific EU authorisation.134 This being so, 
it would be hard to see how the EU could claim to exercise normative control over Member 
State subsidising action where there appears to be no basis in EU law for assessing the 
substantive legality of such action.135 Indeed, even in an area where the EU has exclusive 
competence both externally and internally,136 it may be possible for Member States to act 
outside the scope of EU normative authority in a manner that violates the SCM Agreement: a 
key reason for this is that the Commission’s control powers are limited to government 
support that constitutes ‘State aid’, which is a narrower concept than the WTO’s notion of 
‘subsidy’.137 Second, in terms of remedial action, the EU did not attempt to argue that it was 
                                                        
132 See n 49 above. 
133 See e.g., European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, First Written Submission by the 
European Communities, WT/DS316, dated 9 February 2007, at 89-95 providing the factual background to 
MSF/LA arrangements.  
134 See e.g., Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 63; and Delgado (2011), at 206. In this sense, EC – Large Civil 
Aircraft (2011) significantly differs from the EC – Commercial Vessels (2005) dispute, where EU law was clearly at 
the origin of the national aid schemes found WTO-inconsistent and EU sole responsibility was accepted (see 
section 3.2 above) 
135 Hoffmeister (2010), at 742, stating that it is necessary to establish that EU law governs the substantive legality 
of Member State action as one of the conditions for determining ‘normative control’ of the Union for the 
purpose of international responsibility. 
136 See Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
137 Pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, four cumulative conditions have to be met for a Member State’s measure 
to be considered ‘State aid’ and come within the scope of EU rules: (i) there has been an intervention by the 
State or through State resources; (ii) the intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis; (iii) 
competition has been or may be distorted; (iv) the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States. 
Whereas (i) and (ii) resemble the WTO criteria of ‘financial contribution by a government/public body 
conferring a benefit’ (Annex 1.1) and ‘specificity’ (Articles 1.2 and 2) for determining the existence of a ‘subsidy’ 
under the SCM Agreement, WTO disciplines are clearly not confined to government support measures that 
distort competition and trade within the EU (i.e., conditions (iii) and (iv) for ‘State aid’), but more broadly apply 
to subsidies that affect international trade (e.g., export and import substitution subsidies prohibited under Article 
best placed to implement the Panel’s recommendations. In fact, it is far from evident that the 
Union alone could have remedied the wrongful situation, particularly for those “Member 
State Financing” (or “Launch Aid”) measures that the Panel found to constitute a prohibited 
(export) subsidy under Article 3.1(a) SCM Agreement and had to be withdrawn within 90 
days.138 Under these circumstances, it appears perfectly sensible for the Panel to address 
individual recommendations to each subsidising EU Member State, as they had actual power 
and full discretion to withdraw their WTO-inconsistent subsidies with no need for any prior 
EU legislative action.  
 
Therefore, the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute highlights that a perfect match between 
EU exclusive external competence for WTO matters and exclusive remedial capacity for any breach of 
WTO law, which underlies the ‘competence model’, cannot simply be taken for granted. The 
question remains, however, whether this may be considered a marginal case due to the 
peculiarities of EU State aid rules, or conversely whether similar doubts as to the EU’s 
exclusive ability to provide restitution could arise in other fields of WTO law. Arguably, this 
could also become an issue in WTO disputes involving acts of the Member States apparently 
aimed at implementing EU Directives, where it can be highly complex, particularly for a third 
party, to identify whether the alleged WTO-inconsistent measure was required by EU law, or 
instead results from an autonomous decision of the Member States, or indeed implicates 
both. 139  
 
A case in point is the recent complaint brought by Argentina against the EU and some of its 
Member States regarding certain measures affecting the marketing of biodiesel products and 
supporting the biodiesel industry.140 On the one hand, the EU seems clearly responsible for 
GATT/TBT claims against the ‘sustainability criteria’ for biofuels and bioliquids:141 these are 
established as mandatory common standards in the EU Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality 
Directives142 –i.e., only conforming biofuels and bioliquids may count towards meeting the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 SCM Agreement) and cause ‘adverse effects’ to other WTO members (i.e., so-called ‘actionable subsidies’ 
under Article 5 SCM Agreement). For further discussion, in the specific context of the EC – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2011) dispute, see M. Wu, ‘Why not Brussels? European Community State Aid Rules and the Boeing-Airbus 
Dispute: Comment on Piet Jan Slot’ in K. W. Bagwell, G. A. Bermann and P.C. Mavroidis, Law and Economics of 
Contingent Protection in International Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
138 Panel Report in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), paras. 8.1 and 8.6, pursuant to Article 4.7 SCM Agreement. 
Note, however, that this finding was reversed by the Appellate Body, as it disagreed with the Panel’s standard 
for determining when a subsidy can be considered as de facto contingent upon anticipated export performance 
under Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 SCM Agreement: see AB Report in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), paras. 
1415-1416. 
139 See e.g., European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector, Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS452/1, dated 7 November 2012, at 1, whereby China 
challenges the domestic content restrictions in the feed-tariff programmes of Greece and Italy stating that “these 
measure appear to have been promulgated under the powers delegated to EU Member States by, inter alia, 
Directive 2009/28/EC …” 
140  European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and 
Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 
2013. 
141 Ibid., at 1-4. In particular, Argentina objects to the requirement that, in order to be considered ‘sustainable’, 
biofuels and bioliquids must save at least 35% of green house emissions relative to fossil fuels, arguing that this 
threshold is arbitrary and appears neither to be scientifically proven nor based on any international standard. 
With regards to these GATT/TBT claims (PART A), Argentina appears indeed to invoke solely EU 
responsibility, in referring to Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement: “[…] the measures do not appear to conform to 
the obligation of the European Union to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with the obligations incumbent upon it under the annexed Agreements.” (emphasis added). This 
reference is not made with respect to GATT/SCM claims in Part B of the consultations request (see n144 
below). 
142 See Directive No 2009/28/EC, Article 17; Directive No 2009/30/EC, Article 7(b).  
obligatory national renewable energy targets set out for each Member States143 and/or be 
eligible for financial support– and therefore only the EU is in a position to modify (or 
withdraw) these criteria if found WTO-inconsistent. On the other hand, it is less obvious 
whether the Union is equally responsible for GATT/SCM claims against tax 
exemptions/reductions on such ‘sustainable’ biofuels allegedly applied by some EU Member 
States:144 these tax incentives are not, strictly speaking, required by EU law145 and therefore 
Member States retain the power to withdraw them if found WTO-inconsistent. In fact, this 
case raises the type of responsibility question that was pragmatically avoided in the EC – 
Biotech (2006) dispute discussed above and, should it reach panel proceedings, may provide a 
first opportunity for WTO dispute settlement organs to actually rule on the question of who 
is responsible for conduct of the Member States that is authorised in EU Directives. 146 
 
In addition, one should bear in mind that there is no strict parallelism between EU exclusive 
external competence in the field of the CCP and the distribution of internal regulatory 
competences between the Union and its Member States.147 To put it differently, even if it is 
accepted that the Union has exclusive treaty-making powers for (nearly) all WTO matters, it 
does not have exclusive treaty-infringing powers. There are some important policy fields 
covered by WTO law that have been only partially regulated at EU level and where Member 
States retain considerable regulatory autonomy internally: one example seen earlier is internal 
taxation (covered by GATT)148 and another patent law (covered by TRIPS).149 In these areas, 
                                                        
143 Directive 2009/28/EC, Article 3 and Annex I, sets out legally binding and differentiated targets for each 
Member States, in order to: (i) increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% in EU gross final 
consumption of energy by 2020; (ii) increase the share of renewable energy to 10% of energy used in the 
transport sector in each Member States by 2020. For a discussion, see A. Swinbank, EU Support for Biofuels and 
Bioenergy, Environmental Sustainability Criteria, and Trade Policy (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, June 2009), available at: http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2012/02/eu-support-for-biofuels-
and-bioenergy-environmental-sustainability-criteria-and-trade-policy.pdf.  
144  European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and 
Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 
2013, at 4-7. The EU Member States concerned are Belgium and France.  
145 Directive 2003/96/EC, para. 26 of the Preamble and Article 15 allow Member States to exempt or reduce 
excise duties so as to promote the use of biofuels. As such tax exemption/reduction may constitute ‘State aid’, 
Member States are required (Article 26) to notify such measures to, and obtain approval from, the Commission 
pursuant to Article 108 TFEU (see n49 above). Implementation of such tax incentive schemes varies 
significantly across EU Member States: for an overview, see A. Jung et al., Biofuels – At What Cost? Government 
Support for Ethanol and Biodiesel in the European Union: 2010 Update (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, July 2010), at 42-47, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/bf_eunion_2010update.pdf.  
146 See also, European Union and its Member States — Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by Russia, WT/DS476/2, dated 28 May 2015, concerning inter alia GATS claims 
against Directive (EC) No 2009/73 and Member State implementing measures, particularly by Croatia, Hungary 
and Lithuania. Here, however, the degree of discretion left to the Member States in implementing the EU 
Directive (i.e., they may select among three alternative ‘unbundling’ models provided for in Article 9 in ensuring 
the separation of natural gas production/supply from transmission networks) does not appear to be the only 
rationale for invoking their responsibility: rather, the alleged claims of violation of Articles XVI and XVII GATS 
are based on the specific commitments that the three EU Member States concerned (presumably) undertook in 
their individual Services Schedules (see n 27 above) with respect to pipeline transport services. 
147 This is reflected in Article 207(6) TFEU, providing that the exercise of EU exclusive competence in the field 
of common commercial policy “shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States 
in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.” 
148 Article 113 TFEU provides the legal basis for the harmonisation of national legislations for certain forms of 
taxation (e.g., turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation), but only “to the extent that 
such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to 
avoid distortion of competition.” On this point, see Eeckhout (2006), at 10.  
it could well be that an act of a EU Member State outside the scope of EU legislation infringes 
WTO law. If presented with such a scenario, proponents of EU exclusive responsibility may 
still argue that the Union has internal control mechanisms to effectively ensure compliance 
with an adverse WTO ruling,150 notably by initiating infringement proceedings against the 
Member State(s) concerned. 151  However, from the perspective of the WTO dispute 
settlement organs, why would this be any more effective than holding the infringing EU 
Member State directly responsible?  
 
To sum up, when approaching EU/MS responsibility for breaches of WTO law, the key 
practical question is who has the actual power to provide juridical restitution and secure 
performance of WTO obligations, as underscored by the ‘competence/remedy’ model suggested 
here. From this angle, the internal distribution of competences becomes a relevant criterion 
for the purposes of attributing EU/MS international responsibility: complaining parties 
would generally address their claims,152 and WTO dispute settlement organs their findings, 
based on their assessment of who is in the best position to withdraw or amend the WTO-
inconsistent measure.153 However, and importantly, it does not follow that the EU –and not 
its Member States– is the relevant WTO member in each and every case just because it has 
exclusive external competence for WTO matters. As we have seen, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that EU Member States have no role to play in ensuring conformity of their laws, 
regulations and administrative practices with WTO law, and particularly as we move away 
from highly integrated areas of the CCP. So as long as they remain independent members of 
the WTO, EU Member States can be targeted as respondents and incur responsibility for 
their WTO-infringing conduct, particularly where they retain an actual power to undo the 
wrongful situation –i.e., because EU normative control over their action is either limited or 
absent altogether. That being so, there appears to be no compelling grounds why WTO 
dispute settlement organs should instead rely on the Commission’s infringement action or 
other internal enforcement mechanisms so as to ensure due performance by the Member 
States of their WTO obligations. 
 
4.2 A Case Apart?  
 
The aforementioned ‘competence/remedy’ model to EU/MS international responsibility in 
the WTO inevitably raises the question as to whether the internal division of powers between 
                                                                                                                                                                      
149 Article 118 TFEU provides the legal basis for the creation of European intellectual property rights and for 
the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements. One of the 
few pieces of EU legislation in the field of patent law: Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L213/13. For an 
account of the difficulties in harmonising patent law at the EU level, see chapter by Aurora Plomer in this book.  
150 See Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 39 and 59. 
151 Articles 258 and 260 TFEU; and C – 239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325, para. 
29 (concerning also a ‘mixed’ agreement). Pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU, the WTO covered agreements are 
also binding upon the EU Member States as a matter of EU law, and thus they are under an obligation in EU 
law to adopt the necessary measures to implement WTO obligations, and refrain from taking any measure that 
would undermine due performance of such obligations. See generally, M. Mendez, ‘The Enforcement of EU 
Agreements: Bolstering the Effectiveness of Treaty Law?’ (2010) 47(6) Common Market Law Review 1719.  
152 However, see Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), at 253 rightly noting that complaining parties in the WTO 
may strategically target the EU as a respondent, rather than individual Member States, fostered by the prospects 
of being capable to retaliate (i.e., ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’ as one of the temporary 
remedies provided for in Article 3.7 and 22.2 DSU) against the Union as a whole in their quest to induce 
compliance. Yet arguably, this possibility of retaliating against the Union as a whole is not impaired by bringing 
joint complaints again the EU and (some of) its Member States.   
153  For a similar view, in the context of non-compliance proceedings under multilateral environmental 
agreements, see Nollkaemper (2013), at 343 and 346. 
the Union and its Member States may matter less for determinations of international 
responsibility in other treaty regimes which, unlike the WTO dispute settlement system, do 
not favour juridical restitution as the primary remedy for breaches. This proposition is, 
indeed, supported by the approach taken to the apportionment of responsibility between the 
EU and its Member States in the context of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) 
proceedings, where the most common remedy is monetary compensation.154 Thus, in this 
treaty context, the key question is most often who should pay monetary damages awarded by 
arbitral tribunals, and not so much who holds the power to undo a wrongful act.155 As 
exposed below, even though foreign direct investment (FDI) is also in an area of exclusive 
EU external competence, 156  the Union seems here less eager to assume exclusive 
responsibility at all costs.  
The reasons for this are spelled out in the recently adopted EU Regulation establishing a 
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to State-investor dispute settlement,157 
but are somehow contradictory. On the one hand, the Regulation reaffirms the view that 
international responsibility should follow the internal division of powers: given that the EU is 
exclusively competent to assume international obligations in the field of FDI, only the EU 
can in principle act as a respondent and be held internationally responsible for violations of 
FDI provisions, “irrespective of whether the treatment at issue is afforded by the Union itself 
or by a Member State.”158 On the other hand, the Regulation seeks to distinguish between this 
external responsibility under public international law and the allocation of financial 
responsibility as an internal EU law matter, decided irrespective of international 
responsibility:  
“Where the Union … has international responsibility for the treatment afforded, it 
will be expected, as a matter of international law, to pay any adverse award and bear 
the costs of any dispute. However, an adverse award may potentially flow either from 
treatment afforded by the Union itself or from treatment afforded by a Member State. 
It would as a consequence be inequitable if awards and the costs of arbitration were 
                                                        
154 See e.g., R. Dolzer and C. Shreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2012), at 296-297. 
155 While arbitral tribunals do in principle have the power to award restitution (unless excluded in a given 
investment treaty), it has seldom been requested and awarded in practice. On the reasons for this, see S. 
Ripinsky and K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2008), at 57-59. 
156 Following the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, foreign direct investment is now included within the CCP 
under Article 207(1) TFEU. On this new competence, see inter alia J.A. Bischoff, ‘Just a little BIT of “mixity”? 
The EU’s role in the field of international investment protection law' (2011) 48(5) Common Market Law Review 
1527; J. Chaisse, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment – How Will the 
New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime’ (2012) 15(1) Journal of International Economic 
Law 51; A. Dimopoulos, ‘Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of External 
Relations’ in P.J. Cardwell (ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Asser Press, 2012); 
A.R. Ziegler, ‘The New Competence of the European Union in the Area of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): A 
Third Country Perspective’ in M. Bungenberg and C. Herrmann (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic 
Law – Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon (Springer, special issue, 2013). 
157 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a 
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals 
established by international agreements to which the European Union is party [2014] OJ L257/121 [hereinafter, 
EU Regulation No 912/2014]. For a more detailed account, see chapter by Catharine Titi in this book.  
158 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 3 of the Preamble. See also, European Commission, ‘Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for managing financial 
responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to 
which the European Union is party’ (COM (2012) 335 final), dated 21 June 2012, at 4 stating that: “Should it be 
the case that both the European Union and the Member States are parties to an agreement and it needs to be 
decided who is responsible as a matter of international law for any particular action, the Commission takes the view that 
this has to be decided not by the author of the act, but on the basis of the competence for the subject matter of the international 
rules in question, as set down in the Treaty. In this perspective, it is immaterial that a Member State has competence under 
the rules on the internal market allowing it to legislate in its domestic sphere.” (emphasis added). 
to be paid from the budget of the Union where the treatment was afforded by a 
Member State, unless the treatment in question is required by Union law. It is therefore 
necessary that financial responsibility be allocated, as a matter of Union law, between 
the Union itself and the Member State responsible for the treatment afforded on the 
basis of criteria established by this Regulation.”159 
 
It is questionable whether such a distinction is convincing, among others because the EU 
Regulation directly links the internal allocation of financial responsibility with respondent 
status in ISDS proceedings. As a general rule,160 participation in arbitral proceedings follows 
the division of financial responsibility, whereby the EU should act as sole respondent where 
the dispute: (i) involves (exclusively or also) treatment afforded by its institutions; or (ii) 
involves treatment afforded by the EU Member States insofar as the treatment concerned “is 
required by Union law”.161 Unless this is so, EU Member States should act as the respondent 
in investment disputes concerning treatment afforded by their own organs.162 In case of an 
adverse ruling, EU Member States would not only bear financial responsibility under EU law, 
but also and importantly under international law –i.e., an international law obligation to pay 
damages awarded by the arbitral tribunal in question.163  
 
It follows therefore that, in the context of ISDS, the Union is only ready to take up 
international responsibility for acts of its Member States to the extent that such conduct is 
required by EU law. While this criterion is not crystal-clear and may not always be easy to 
apply in practice,164 ‘required by Union law’ does narrow the scope of EU sole responsibility 
for the acts of its Member States in the investment context. Arguably, it does not encompass 
all instances in which EU Member States act in the execution of EU legislation, but this will 
depend on the level of discretion left to them in terms of implementation.165 In other words, 
                                                        
159 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 5 of the Preamble. 
160 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, Article 9 provides exceptions to this general rule, whereby the EU will act as 
the respondent independently of where financial responsibility lies, notably: (i) where similar treatment is being 
challenged in a related claim against the Union in the WTO, provided that a WTO panel has been established 
and the claim concerns the same specific legal issue and it is necessary to ensure consistent argumentation in the 
WTO (Article 9(3)); and (ii) where EU Member States decline to act as respondents, even though financial 
responsibility lies with them (Article 9(1)(b)).  
161 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraphs 7-9 of the Preamble; Article 3(1)(a) and (c); Article 4(1); Article 9 
(2).  
162 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, Article 9(1). Therefore, the Regulations seeks to eliminate the possibility of 
bringing a claim simultaneously against both the EU and the Member States: see further, F. Baetens, G. Kreijen 
and A. Varga, ‘Determining International Responsibility under the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: 
What Foreign Investors in the EU Should Know’ (2014) 47(5) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1203, at 
1225-1227. This ‘either/or’ approach has also been incorporated in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement, Article X.20, which provides a procedural mechanism for the determination of 
respondent status in disputes with the EU or its Member States. In essence, the EU is under an obligation to 
inform the investor concerned as to whether the Union or a Member State shall be the respondent and thus 
discharge international responsibility. If it fails to do so within 50 days, responsibility will be divided as follows: 
(i) where the measures identified by the investor are exclusively measures of a Member State, that Member State 
shall be the respondent; (ii) where the measures identified by the investor include measures of the EU, the 
Union shall be respondent.  
163  A. Dimopoulos, ‘The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Question of 
Responsibilities’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1671, at 1677-1678.  
164 See on this point, C. Tiejte, E. Sipiorsk and G. Topfër, Responsibility in Investor – State Arbitration in the EU 
(European Parliament, 2012), at 18-19, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/457126/EXPO-
INTA_ET%282012%29457126_EN.pdf. 
165 See notably, Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 7 of the Preamble, qualifying this criterion in the 
context of EU Directives: “… where the Member State acts in a manner required by Union law, for example in 
transposing a directive adopted by the Union, the Union itself should bear financial responsibility in so far as the 
emphasis here is not so much on who is competent for contracting the international 
investment obligation in question, but rather on whether a provision in EU law is actually at 
the origin of the breach. Whereas this more cautious approach in asserting EU exclusive 
responsibility vis-à-vis that taken in the WTO may be explained by moral hazard concerns,166 
it is nonetheless at odds with the Union’s own argument that the scope of EU exclusive 
external powers should be the decisive factor for assigning EU/MS responsibility under mixed 
agreements.167  
 
5)  CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is largely undisputed that the European Union has played a prominent role in the WTO 
dispute settlement system over the past two decades. As one of the rare international fora 
where the EU is actually allowed to fully participate in dispute settlement proceedings, it is 
not surprising that the Union has been eager to stand as a ‘responsible’ –if not ‘over-
responsible’–actor in the multilateral trading system, even if not always compliant with WTO 
law. And yet, this ‘success story’ should not lead us to overstate neither the degree to which 
third parties have accepted the EU’s eagerness to assume exclusive responsibility for breaches 
of WTO law by its Member States, nor the relative impact of its own competence rules on 
determinations of EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. The main reason calling 
for a more qualified assessment is that we simply do not have (as of yet) well-established 
authoritative WTO jurisprudence on the sensitive question of when can Member State 
conduct be attributed to the Union: 168 as we have seen, it has been raised and adjudicated 
only on three occasions in WTO panel proceedings and never thus far in Appellate Body 
proceedings. In addition, WTO dispute settlement practice reveals that joint complaints 
against the EU and its Member States have not ceased, even if the Union has been granted 
exclusive external powers for almost all WTO matters under the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Nonetheless, in the three cases where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, WTO panels 
have categorically held that EU Member States are bound to perform all obligations 
incumbent upon them under the WTO Agreement (and its annexed agreements), so as long as 
they remain full and independent members of the WTO and irrespective of the (exclusive) 
powers they may have transferred to the Union in the CCP field under EU law. While this 
stance may grate on the ears of most EU lawyers, it is legally sound from an international law 
standpoint. Moreover, it also wise from a broader governance perspective: to put it bluntly, it 
is not for WTO dispute settlement organs to turn the WTO Agreement de facto into a ‘pure’ 
                                                                                                                                                                      
treatment concerned is required by Union law.” (emphasis added). For a seemingly more flexible reading as 
incorporating all instances in which EU Member States act to implement EU law, see A. Delgado Casteleiro, 
‘The International Responsibility of the European Union – The EU Perspective: Between Pragmatism and 
Proceduralisation’ (2012-2013) 15 Cambridge Journal of European Legal Studies 563, at 580-581 (referring to the 
“EU’s normative control”) and 586 (referring to “implementing EU law”).  
166 See Dimopoulos (2014), at 1676, noting that, unlike in the WTO dispute settlement system (where the 
primary remedy is not compensation), the assumption by the EU of international responsibility for all Member 
State acts violating investment obligations raises very significant moral hazard concerns: “Member States may act 
in violation of their obligations under EU [international investment agreements], knowing that compensation 
will be paid by the EU and (indirectly) shared by all Member States.” Arguably, similar moral hazard concerns 
could arise with regards to retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system, albeit this is only a secondary 
remedy therein (see n 152 above). 
167 See section 2.2 above.  
168 See section 3.4 above, indicating that the vast majority of the total 68 WTO disputes in which the EU was 
targeted as sole respondent concerned EU measures only –and not Member States measures as such– and 
therefore there was no ambiguity that such EU acts were attributable to the Union.  
EU agreement for the purpose of international responsibility.169 That being so, in assigning 
international responsibility –i.e., whether solely to the EU (EC – Computer Equipment (1998) 
and EC – IT Products (2010)) or jointly with (some of) its Member States (EC – Large Civil 
Aircraft (2011)), these WTO panels were seemingly guided by one pragmatic consideration: 
who has the actual power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent? 
Therefore, it is this special feature of the WTO dispute settlement system –i.e., a clear 
preference for juridical restitution as a primary remedy for breaches of WTO law– that 
ultimately renders the internal division of competences between the EU and the Member 
States a relevant criterion in deciding who should be held responsible. This 
‘competence/remedy’ model for managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO 
may thus remain a case apart, unique to that dispute settlement regime, as notably 
demonstrated by the more cautious EU approach emerging in the investment field.   
 
However, and contrary to what other scholars appear to suggest,170  it is not a foregone 
conclusion that the EU is always the one and only entity with the actual power to provide 
juridical restitution in the WTO dispute settlement system, just because it has exclusive 
external competence for nearly all WTO matters. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes 
to highly harmonised segments of the CCP (e.g., tariffs and customs matters), where Member 
States conduct is strictly confined to implementing directly applicable EU legislation: 
evidently, the EU only can amend/withdraw such legislation if found WTO-inconsistent. 
And yet, as we have seen, it is less straightforward why the EU would also have such an 
exclusive remedial capacity for breaches of WTO law in cases where its normative control 
over Member State action is more limited, or indeed entirely absent: for instance, why 
couldn’t the EU Member States concerned withdraw themselves their own subsidies, or 
regulatory measures permitted but not required by EU law, if found WTO-inconsistent? In 
fact, from the perspective of providing juridical restitution, it is not the division of external 
(i.e., treaty-making) competences between EU and Member States that is of primordial 
importance, but of internal (treaty-infringing/treaty-performing) competences and these are 
not within the exclusive regulatory domain of the Union for all subject matters covered by 
WTO law.171 This being so, insofar as EU Member States are targeted as a respondent in a 
given WTO dispute and hold the power to end an eventual breach of their WTO obligations, 
there is no cogent reasons why WTO dispute settlement organs should rely on EU control 
mechanisms172 instead of making them directly responsible and accountable under WTO law. 
Indeed, it could be argued that this would not only make little sense from an international law 
perspective, but also be undesirable for intra-EU ‘fairness’ considerations. To retake the logic 
underpinning the EU Regulation on financial responsibility in the ISDS context,173 why would 
it be any more ‘fair’ in the WTO for the EU alone to face the consequences of international 
responsibility (including possible retaliation) en bloc, when a breach of WTO law is caused by 
                                                        
169 In a post-Lisbon setting, this would have likely been the practical consequence had WTO dispute settlement 
organs accepted the Commission’s proposition (supported by some EU law scholars) that the apportionment of 
obligations should strictly follow the distribution of external competences under EU law and be the decisive 
factor in assigning international responsibility (see section 2.2 above) 
170 See note 130 above. 
171 See sections 2.3 and 4.1 above, pointing to several policy areas covered by WTO law where there has been (as 
of yet) no full harmonisation of national laws, because they have been only partially regulated at EU level (e.g., 
minimum standard Directives in the areas of consumer and environmental protection), or even not at all (e.g., 
certain forms of internal taxation). 
172 Again, doing so would de facto turn the WTO Agreement into a ‘pure’ EU agreement, whereby EU Member 
States are not seen as WTO members in their own right and bearers of the contractual obligations, but mere 
vehicles for carrying out the EU’s obligations under WTO law.   
173 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 5 of the Preamble, discussed in section 4.2 above. 
the discretionary (i.e., where EU law merely authorises) or fully autonomous (i.e., where there 
is no EU legislation) decision of one (or some) of its Member States?  
 
In closing, it is important to underline that the issue of EU/MS international responsibility in 
the WTO is not, of course, a purely legal question but one highly political for all players 
involved. For the EU, the capacity to speak with one voice and assert its exclusive 
responsibility in the WTO dispute settlement system is certainly instrumental in forging its 
own identity as a leading trade actor and power on the global stage,174 but also important at a 
more practical level. 175  At the same time, it appears politically unviable for (some) EU 
Member States to even consider relinquishing their independent membership of the WTO.176 
For their part, other WTO members may target the EU and its Member States jointly as 
respondents not solely out of genuine legal concerns, 177  but strategically as a means to 
challenge the Union’s unity and leadership in the WTO.178 In these circumstances, the EU 
and its Member States may increasingly find themselves at a crossroad between maintaining 
their ‘mixed’ membership of the WTO while claiming the EU’s ‘exclusive’ responsibility in its 
dispute settlement system. Indeed, aside from voting and other political considerations,179 one 
may well question whether there is still a legal need, as a matter of EU law,180 for the parallel 
double EU/MS membership of the WTO members: in other words, have EU exclusive 
powers under the CCP now become sufficiently broad for the Union to assume alone the 
obligations of WTO membership?181 And if so, does it have effective internal mechanisms at 
its disposal to ensure implementation of those obligations by its Member States?182 It is not 
the purpose of the present chapter to engage with these convoluted questions of EU law, nor 
                                                        
174 See inter alia, Baetens, Kreijen and Varga (2014), at 1244; Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), at 255. 
175  See Kuijper (2010), at 224, arguing that “[f]or practical reasons, there can be no question of drafting 
submissions to WTO Panels and Appellate Body in a commission consisting of the Commission and all the 
Member States: it would be the death of any coherent application or defence before these jurisdictional organs.” 
176 See e.g., see M. Hanh and L. Danieli, ‘You’ll Never Walk Alone: the European Union and its Member States 
in the WTO’ in M. Bungenberg and C. Herrmann (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law – Common 
Commercial Policy After Lisbon (Springer, special issue, 2013), at 63 arguing that it could even cause “a 
constitutional crisis” in some EU Member States (e.g., Germany if the Lisbon Treaty was interpreted as 
requiring their withdrawal from the WTO.   
177 Arguably, the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) case could be cited as an example here. 
178 Arguably, the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010) cases could be seen as an example 
of the US ‘divide and rule’ strategy: see Billiet (2005), at 199. 
179 Pursuant to Article IX(1) WTO Agreement, the EU does not just have one vote in WTO decision-making 
but a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States (i.e., 28 at present). In reality, this ‘greater 
voting power’ has thus far been of limited value given to the consensus-based WTO decision-making practice. 
However, the WTO Agreement does provide for the possibility to resort to voting and, from this perspective, 
the EU may not want to give up its current advantage should WTO decision-making practice move away from 
consensus in the future. On this point, see M. Bungenberg, ‘Going Global? The EU Common Commercial 
Policy after Lisbon’ in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 
(Springer, 2010), at 134-135; Hanh and Danieli (2013), at 53-54. 
180 In principle, from a WTO law perspective, any member may unilaterally withdraw from the WTO, six 
months after the written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General (Article XV(1) WTO 
Agreement).  
181 From an EU law perspective, besides the exclusion of transport services from the scope of the CCP (see n 22 
above), EU Member States seem to attach particular significance to the fact that they (not the EU) contribute to 
the WTO budget to justify their continued participation in the organisation: see e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review 
Body, ‘Trade Policy Review – Report by the European Union’ (WT/TPR/G/248), dated 1 June 2011, at 6 
(footnote 2) noting that “Member States maintain an active role in the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration” after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, see Opinion 1/94, para. 21, where the 
Court already opined: “Given that the WTO is an international organization which will have only an operating 
budget and not a financial policy instrument, the fact that the Member States will bear some of its expenses 
cannot, on any view, of itself justify participation of the Member States in the conclusion of the WTO 
Agreement.” 
182 On this point, see n 151 above. 
to take a position on the highly controversial and politically sensitive issue of whether the 
Member States should remain WTO members in their own right.183 What is here submitted is 
that it is for the EU and its Member States to address these matters in-house, and meanwhile 
the WTO dispute settlement organs have made a judicious choice not to interfere.  
 
 
                                                        
183 In favour of preserving the status quo, see e.g., Hanh and Danieli (2013), at 61-63. For a seemingly different 
view, see among others, Bungenberg (2010), at 134.  
